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The Final Utility , of Speolllation on the New Yprk StoQk 
Exohange and the Chi9ago Board of Trade't ' 
One is indeed treading on aanger oua ground when he ven-
tures to ' speak of that c€)mpl~i ty of ~Q>mplexi ties, nSpeoul$tion.lI 
It . is not often, indeed, that two persons disoussing this te~ic, 
.-
agree on a definition of', or on a point of vielll from whioh to 
eons ider, this great aocompaniment of modern busine,ss condi ti ons. 
All know of its vague presence but few see the outlines of this 
inst1t:tttion~ 'r which .·at.recta many of us directly or indirectly, 
e.g., ' the priee which we pay for our cotton garments or for the 
bread which we eat is influenced more or less byspeoulation -
S,ome people refuse to believe tha.t Speculat ion. is anything but 
gambling; some, that there is even a modicttm of good in it. 
~ere'/are; of course, '8 few ho think that ,1. hatever is, i s 
Unfortunately, Speculation is looked at most fre-
quent~y frem the moral stand~oint, and a distressing pioture 
of the v: idolVeci mother and her only son caught in t he tentacles 
of that hid eous' octopus, Speculation, iS I" 1?res'ented to us. 
~e object of this paper is to arrive at some conclus i on 
whether s peculation is beneficial or not, whether string ent 
restrictive measures to stamp out its existence should or 
I 
should not be t aken. As Speou4.ation is primarily a.n economic 
institution, its aeon mic advantages and disadvantages will 
be briefly considered; its legality or illegality, morality 
or ilmPorality, will be touched upon, as they must be, in order 
xii 
to determine whether it is Ilall worth while or not.n Speou.-
lation is a vast subject; UiO of its main subdivisions are, 
Speculation in securities on the stock exchanges, and specula.-
tion in commodities in the produce exchanges. These two 
subdivisions'are so closely united that it seems best to treat 
them together rather than only one of them. Accordingly both 
will be considered in this paper. ~o narrow the subjeot 
still farther, the :Ne-w York Stock Exchange and. the Chiaago 
Board of ,Trade have been singled out for especia.l study. '. Esoh 
of them , is the leading exchange of its kind in the United . . 
States, and some will be found who say, in the whole world. 
Then, more particularly defined, the issue i i , do the advan-
tages engendered of these two institutions so far outweigh 
the accompanying disadvantages, that it is proper to say tllet 
the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Boara of Trade ar~ 
of re~l benefit to the countr.y at large? 
In order to determine this, it is of course necessary to 
consider these advantages and disadvantages. As the subjeet 
is somewhat technical, some space has been devoted to an ex-
planation of terms and methods of business before taking up 
the question before us. 
S PEe U L A T ION . 
IN':'RODUCTION. 
History. 
It is a well known fact that all men are not equally 
clever, able, and shrewd. And since this is so, it it not 
reasonable to suppose tha,.t men possessing great ability and 
knowledge have always been and always will be, willing to take ., 
great risks for the sake of great gains? At any r ate whether 
they always have been or always will be willing to do so, we 
hear of speculation in very early times. We read that Joseph 
"Qornered ll the grain c.ropof Egypt, a.lthough it usually is not 
stated in suoh bald and modern language. Aristotle relates 
that the philosopher Theles "cornerean the o,live pres s es ef 
Miletus. It · is interesting to note that Thales did this, 
al though he was a compare. t i vely poo r man, by securing opt ion. 
on the use of the olive presses at the end of one season for 
1 2 
the following season~ There are a few lines in Hor~ce 
3 
wh ich 'have been taken by some scholars to refer to spe~ulation 
by the money changers. 
1. Aristotle, Politics, I,ll, ~ 8, Jowett's ~ranslation, p .2~, 
I,ondon ,1885. 
2. Horace, book 2, satire 3,li.18-19 - lIPostquam omnia res- '~ 
3. Jeanneret, Jules Felix , Le jen, le Pari, et les Marches de 
Bourse, part 2 ,p.107. 
2 
Livtyl s peaks of Ie Collegium mercatorum, which existed 
at Rome at a 'l very early date, found.ed 259 B.O. Some of the 
most ancient Bourses known are those of Anvers (1531), of Lyon 
(before 1549), Toulouse (1549, London (1556), Hambourg (1558), 
Rouen (1566), Amsterdam (1608), Copenhagen (1642), Paris (1724), 
2 
Vienna (1771). May 17,1792 is the dawof the organization 
which has b ecorne the New York Stock Exchange. Six 0 f th e Ex-:-
changes were established within 35 years after the format~on 
of the first one at Anvers, r a ther tending to show that spee~ 
u~ation had grown to considerable proportions in different eom-
munities at about the same time. In 1400 Yarraouth was the 
center of a large s peculative business in herring, as well as 
a large actual trade in herring. Early in the 17th centur.y 
s peculation took the form of time transactions in the products 
of whale fisheries. Still later the famous tulip s peculation 
of 1634-37 took place. This s pecl1lation is said to ha.ve 
aroused' a tremendous interest allover HOlland. The s p ecula-
tion which took place in England about 1711 was, it is probable, 
the greatest speculation of modern times. To secure stock at 
Whatever price in whatever concern was thought to be an infal-
lible method of accumula ting riches. We are told by an ob-
serVer, of the times that the carriages of fine ladies crowded 
the IlAll,ey", and that dandies vied with chamber maids in the 
mad craze after rainbow gold. The following prospectus shows 
1. Tite Live, II,27 -
2. There is some dispute as to some of the dates €'J:ven - ~ee 
I Dos Passos 8- I have adopted th~se given by J~neret part 
2,lo9. 
3 
to what limits the fever ran. II~oney was asked to finance 11 A 
company for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but 
nobod.y to know what it is." Each subscriber of a £2 deposit 
was to receive;: 'if100 per annum. It is said that 1000 shares 
were taken in six hours, and the deposits paid. Many of the 
schemes hoisted on the innocent public today are very thin, but 
we have had none quite so bald as this project of two hundred 
years ago. When this great "South Sea Bubble" burst it in-
volved hundreds in ruin. Even the ~ank of England stood in a 
precari~us s;.tu~tion for a short time as it unwisely tried. to 
bolster up the market. But the pressure became so strong that 
the bank repudiated its contract and, in consequence lived 
through the great panic which ensued. 
There are many speculations in the United States which 
have attracted much attention. Among them of course are the 
Vanderbilt squeezes in Harlem and New Haven, Daniel Drew's ap-
parently inexhaustible supply of convertible bonde of Erie, 
Black Frida.y, Hutchinson's successful corner in wheat on the 
Chicago Board of Trade, Pardridge's wheat op~rationsF l eiter's 
unsuccessful attempt at a corner in wheat, Sully's attempted 
corner in cotton, and Patten's recent operations on Chieago 
Board of ~rade and in cotton. Many others such as the great 
fight over the Great Nort:q.ern R .R~ by James J .Hill and. 'E~H. 
Harriman could be cited, and the annals of our exchanges ar$ 
full of the rapid rise and still, more rapid tall 0f great 
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operators and speculators. Jerome, Little, Gould, Baring, 
Rothschild, Cooke, and many others have had their ascents and 
most of them have had corresponding d~scents. It is interest-
ing to note that one of the American houses which was second 
only to Jay, Cooke & Co. many years ago still remains under t he 
same management, a pparently solid and safe as the Bank of Eng-
land. Speculation, however, has become of great importance 
only since the modern conditions of trade, industry, and busi-
ness have been so vitalized, or roughly speaking, only during 
the last fifty to seventy-five years~ 
Definition. 
And now what is this thing, "Speculation". of 
Definition 
proper. l':hich We have been speaking? Vfuat do we mean by 
SI)eculatiol}? As has been stated before, Qnly that 
speculation which takes place in the pits of the produce ex-
change and on the floorfl of the stock exchange will be consid-
ered. Now speculation, so narrowed, has many different mean-
ings for many different people. A great many writers on eco-
nomic subjects use the word in different senses. To some it 
means gambling pure and simple; to others it means a precarious 
methoa of making a living. It brings to some a bitter memory 
of former losses, caused, so think the victims, by the dishon-
esty rampant upon the street. Returning to the different de.f-
initions of the word as used by writers on subjects in the 
5 
field of Economics, at the risk of seeming pedantic a number of 
definitions will be given. Among them is one used by Mr.Ha~-
ley: "Speculative buisness is that which inVOlves large risks ' 
for the chance of large gains.~ This differs from ordinary 
investment, as, here, safety of the principal is not the one 
essentia l demanded, but chance of large return, even at the 
risk of losing the amount of capital 
In a somewhat narrower sense, s peculation llconsists in 
buying and selling commodities, or securities, or other prop-
2 
"erty in he>pe of profit from anticipated changes of value .. n 
Here the speculator hopes to profit because the value of some 
article which he has dealt in, may change, and will in the spec-
ulator's opinion. It is not producing wealth, but taking ad-
vantage of fluctuations in the value of articles already produced. 
One well-known student of Wall Street investment says that 
a man speculates when the desire for a profit is so strong tha t 
the safetp · of the principal becomes of less importance than the 
thought of large gain. This involves the same idea as the def-
inition first quoted, illustrating once more the difference be-
tween investment and speculation. The following is a c~nser-
vative definition: "Specula tion consists in the forcasting 
changes of value, and buying or selling in order to take ad-
vantage of them; it may be wholly legitimate, pure gambling, 
1. Railroad ~ransportation, p.48. 
2. Speculation on Stock or Produce Exchanges of the U.S. H.C. 
Emery, Col.Univ. Studies,VIII,p.96. 
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or something partaking of the quali,ties of both. fI ':::his def-
inition will bear thought. Th~re is in it no hint of proclue-
tion of 'wealth. The gain to the speculator consists in taking 
advantage of changes in value, due to outside factors, as de. 
mand and supply etc. In order to forecast changes of value 
one should know something of condi t ions, both pres·ent and fu-
ture, which are liable to cause fluctuations in value of the 
article in which one intends to s peculate. It will be noticed 
that the speculator, !hm order"to take advantage of them ll bws 
and sells. That is one thing in speculation which it is im-
portant to remember, t hat the speculator buys and sells. As 
a matter of fact all buying and selling for the sake of gain, 
tends to be speculative, and whether it is or is not largely 
depends on the care which is taken for the safety of the amount 
risked. Perhaps t h e moralist might not be inclined to accept 
t h is definition or idea of what speculation is, but when we Bay 
speculation in the course of this paper, the idea meant to be 
expressed is one of risking the safety of capital in purchases 
and sales on the stock and in the produce exchanges of the 
United States for the sake of ga ins. 
And now let us look at the latter half of this 
Contrasted 
with definition. We all know of cases in whieh some 
gambling 
man with a large amount of capital and great ability, 
has been able to forecast the future condition of the market 
1. Report of Gov.Hughes' Committee on Speculation in Securities 
and Commodities, p.3. 
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and has bought or sold accordingly. Perha:ps some Slunmer you 
forsaw a very Severe winter and made an advantageous contract 
for the future delivery of coal at a favorable price. ~hat 
was legitimate business no doubt. Now I ask you to distinguish 
between your own coal buying and the large operations of a 
speculator in the wheat p it, who forsaw conditions correctly 
better than anyone else including the crop forcasters of the 
United States Department of Agriculture? One transaction was 
on a larger seale than the other, that is true. One bought 
coal of a coal dealer, and the other bought wheat in the wheat 
pit of other speculators. But w,;hat difference in princ iple is 
ther e between the twoi It is hard to see . And yet no doubt 
some of the yery ' men who called the larger transact~on gambling, 
had perhaps bought their coal etc, in this way . Now is this 
gambling? It is so denominated by many people and it is not 
hard to find public expressions of that idea. But is it not 
legitimate business? If it cannot be distinguished from the 
coal buying case, -the average citizen would no doubt call it 
I1good business. 1t Even if it can be distinguished, most people 
'Would, I believe, say that this wa~~legitimate as mod,ern condi -
tions permit. Certainly they do not publicly blame the com-
miSSion man or merchant who stocks up in advance of most of his 
compet itors. 
And, on the other hand, we all know of cas es of, say, a 
broken down old man who spends all his feV! available cents in 
8 
the bucket shop b~.t on some sure thing, that a friend who has 
a friend who is a clerk in the employ of Patten has whispered 
in his ear with the foolish injunction to tell no one else. 
One extreme offsets the other. But when the sentimentalists 
view this extreme, pity, indignation etc. replace the weighing 
of economic ~ :.evil and good, and sentimentality hurriedly cries 
HD~wn with speculation which renders such a condition possible. T1 
Without doubt the last is very near to, if not pure gambling. 
We have a.ll Seen both cases, and in one perhaps we ha.ve envied 
the "·lucky devil", a.nd in the other, pi tied the lIpoor .fool " . 
Now there is another or middle class rather, of s pecula-
tive activities which partakes both of the nature of legitimate 
business and of gambling. This is the most difficult class 
with which to deal, without doubt. What are we going to say 
about the roajori ty of the dealings on the floors of the ex-
changes? Is it gambling for one of the several aeroplane fac-
tories of Paris to book orders for two years ahead, as has been 
done? As a matter of fact s peculation enters into almoat all 
business transactions involving future conditions, a.nd feW 
transactions do not involve future considerations. A landowner 
leases, that is, sells an estate out of his lland for a lOllg 
term of years, say 99. Is he a gambler? The matter can hard-
\ 
ly be better put than has been already done. "It may be aek-
nowledged that every producer for a future market- that ie 
practically every producer - i~ to some extent, a s peculator. 
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He anticipates what will be wanted, at what prices, aha in what 
quantities, and sets to work to provide a supply in accordance 
1 
with those anticipatinns. t1 
Now is this middle class of s peculation gambling, or is 
it not? That is one great criticism of s peculation. Now let 
us see what happens in a gambling transaction. A bets B that 
"Bear Tl will win the d.erby. Both A and B put up their money, 
to be won by one or the other upon the determination of some 
fortuitous event. It is true that neither one produces any 
wealth. · .New we will suppose that A buys of B on the New York 
Stock Exchange, one-hundred shares of Union Pacific at $200 per 
share. YYhat has happened here? A has become the owner of 
certain property. He is subject to all the duties of a prop-
erty owner. He must pay taxes on that stock (at least in some 
states) • If an assessment is declared A must dig into his 
pocket. But he has also the privileges of a property OWner. 
If a dividend is declared, A receives his share. A can take 
these shares to the bank and use them as collateral and borrow 
money on them. In other words he has acquired certain pro perty . 
thinking that the price will change in such a way as to benefit 
him. Now this certainly seems to be quite different from our 
Ii ttle gambling transaction. Moreover vlhen the TlBear ll did win 
the TI erby A won exact ly what B lost. But when A bought U»ion 
Pacific of B for $200, which B bought for $175, A did not make 
money out of BTa 10S8, and neither did A make monel out of "CIS 
1. Prof. Flux, Economic Principles, p.158. 
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1css when A seld Unicn Pacific .te C fer $225. Perhaps many 
will ebject that the Unien Pacific sale is net a typica l 
transactien. But it is exactly typical of what eccurs on the 
fleer ef the New Yerk Steck E..."'{change every day, except tha.t the 
fluctuatiens have been largely exaggerated. Scme ene will ask 
a.beut the "wind" transactiens in the wheat pit , U they are 
net pure gambling. Suppese A buys 10,000 bushels of wheat 
from B to be delivered in May at $1.00. B has bought that 
wheat frem some farmer in Nerth Daketa, and paid fer it 90~ 
say. NO,Vi if that is the cnly transact ion which A make,a, B is 
beund abselutely to. deliver that wheat to A. But suppese that 
B sees a goed chanoe to. sell his real wheat to. C for 95,. He 
dees so. and makes a prefit. NeVl when May cernes along, A Sees 
an epportunity to. make one cent a bushel by selling this wheat 
which he has beught ef B to. be delive*ed in May. New it just 
happens that A sells to. B at $1,,01, 10,000 bushels ·of wheat to. 
be delivered, in May. B is bound to. deliver 10,000 bushels to. 
A at $1.00, and A is bound to. deliver 10,000 bushels to. B at 
$1.01. New these transac·tiens cancel eaeh ether. It 'WQ.uld 
be an ecenemic waste fer each man to. hand ev-er to. the other ex-
act.ly the same amount ef exa~tly the same thing. A. has made 
1~ per bush-el. B has made 4, per bushel, less the cost of 
r 
carrying the wheat. This iSI!ico.mmonly chara.cterized as buying 
and selling Ilwlind fl wheat, and takes place eTeryhour, and. some-
times every minute in the pit. But is this g$mbling? 
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hardly seems so. A and B have both profited by the change in 
the market price of something which each owned. If A and B 
went to the trouble and expense of delivering the actual pro-
duct, there would be no such cry of uGambling ll • But it is 
certainly reasonable to suppose that if Z and Y, two of these 
re fo rmers who cry II Gambling" were in such a si tua t ion that X 
owed Y $1000, and that Y owed X $1100, that Y would merely pay 
X $100, and not go to the trouble of paying X $llOO·anc1 demand-
ing and reeeiving $1000 in return. 
There are several distinctions made by writers between 
gambling and speculating. One suggests that there is a fixed 
sum lost and won in gambling and an uncertain one in speculat-
ing. Some writers lay great stress on the knowledge of what 
1 
will occur in the future or the lack thereof, and others re-
mark upon the different odds in gambling and speculating, say-
ing ·that in gambling all chances are equalized as much as possi-
ble, whereas this is not so in speculation. 
Other so-called distinctions might be pointed out. We 
have already seen one decided difference, that is, that specu-
lation subjects the speculator to the duties and rights of a 
property owner, While gambling does not. But there may be 
another distinction of value. Not many people would deny that 
1. nDans Ie jen proprement dit Ie resultat depend entterement 
on presque entierement du hasard. A. la Bourse cleat une 
science de caleul, une connaissance des tegles economiquea 
at une ~tude souvent longue qui deoident Ie speoulateur a 
operer sur tels on tels titre on sur telle on telle merchan-
dise." Jeanneret, Jules F~lix. La Jen Ie ?ari, et lea 
Marches de Bourse, part II,p.lOB. 
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gambling is pernicious from every standpoint, moral and economi~.1 
and tha t it should be stamped out, as it performs no good which 
can overweigh the admitted bad". But is that so in respect to 
s peculation? If s peculation performs economic good, and if 
this econGmic good overweighs its admitted moral and economic 
evils, then one can say that s peculation is productive of good,' 
that it has utility. If this is so, and the object of this 
paper is to -ascertain whether this is so, t h en clearly there is 
a line of demarcation between gambling and specula ting. 
The Stock and Produce Exchanges. 
Organization and Internal Regnlation. 
Stock and Produce Exchanges are primarily markets, that is 
to say, places for buying and selling. That is exactly what 
the Exchanges are; the buying and selling is done by members 
of organizations under certain rules. Muoh of the hue and cry 
against exchanges seems to be because of the organization of 
the markets into exchanges. As there has been need of many 
places for buying and selling in the United States, so there 
are msny stock and produce exchanges. In fact there are two 
stock ex changes, Seven produce exchanges , a nd a security market 
without fixed membership called the 11 Curb II , in New York City 
alone. Since the New York Stock Exchang e is, by far, the most 
impor tant in the United s tates, a slight description of its 
organization, methods of procedure etc. may well be given here. 
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Practically all of the stock exchanges are modelled upon the 
New York Stock Exchange, and any description of speculation on 
the stock exchanges will be confined to that going on, on the 
floor of the New York Stock Exchange. 
May 17,1792 a number of brokers met, formed an organiza-
tion, and agreed as follows: llWe, the Subscribers, Brokers for 
the purchase and sale of Public Stock, do hereby solemnly prom-
ise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will not buy 
or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of 
Public Stoek at a less rate than 1/4 of 1% commission on the 
specie value, and that we will give a preferenee to each other 
in our negotiations."l This was signed by twenty-five brokers 
who met under a tree opposite to number 60 Wall Street. Such 
was that which has become the powerful and influential New York 
stmck Exchange. In 1817 there was a reorganization, and by 
1820 the Stock Exchange was firml y start ed, From meeting in 
top floors of one building a ft er another, the Stock Exchange 
has come to meet in its own well-kno~ building on Broad Street. 
From twenty-five members it has grown to its present size 
of 1100, about seven hundred of whom are active. The only 
way in which it is possible to obtain a seat now, is upon the 
sale of a member's seat. Seats are sold for rather high prices 
$80,000 being the sum which a seat brought a few years ago. 
The Exchange itself does no business, and is an unincorporated, 
1. History of the New York Stock Exchange, p.2. 
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,voluntary association with almost unlimited powers over its 
members. It is interesting to note that although incorpora-
tion has been urged upon both the New York and the London Stock 
Exchanges, both are still unincorporated. The legal title to 
all the personal property yests in all the members, but the 
real estate is owned by a corporation created for that sole 
purpose in 1863. The Stock Exchange OVIns $,):1 the stock of 
this corporation. 
The Constitution states that the objects of the associa-
tion l1shall be to furnish exchange rooms and other facilities 
for the convenient transaction of their business by its members; 
and to promote and inculcate just and .ethical principles of 
·1 
trade and business. 11 It has been said that all three of these 
objects have been successfully attained. At the present time 
many of the members of the Stock Exchange are not only agents 
of speculators but are speculators themselves, differing thus 
from the members of the London Stock Exchange, who act on the 
~change only for others. A number of rich men are members 
for the sole purpose of taking advabtage of the smaller rates 
of co~nission on transactions between members. The rules of 
the Stock Exchange are the growth of many years, and represent 
the combined experience of hlmdreds of traders as the most sat-
isfactory methods of buying and selling on the floor. There 
1. As quoted in Conway, Investment, Speculation,p.15. (As the 
Secretary of the Stock Exchange informed me that the supply 
of the 6onstitution was Tltoo limited to furnish one to all 
who might be interested t herein l1 , I was unable to escertain 
the article and section. , It is given as Art.I in II Das Pass 
os 1075, Appendix, practically the s.~e . as . ~n . CODr~ay.) 
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are several officers, including a president, tteasurer, secre-
tary and chairman. The latter presides over the Exchange and 
maintains order. The governing ~ower of the Exchange is in the 
hands of the Governing Committee of forty, or forty-two, includ-
ing the president and treasurer, who are members ex officio. 
At each annual election ten members of this committee are elect-
ed and also the president and treasurer. The Governing Com-
mittee elects the secretary and a vice president. It also 
elects and dissolves twelve standing committees out of its own 
membership, which perform all the business necessary to be 
transacted during the year. Among the most prominent committees 
are those on Admission, Arbitration, Arrangement, Listing, Law 
etc. It is thus readily seen that the Governing Committee ex-
erts almost absolute power over the members of the Stock Exchange. 
A candidate for admission must receive a two-thirds vote 
of the Committee on Admission. If refused, he may apr ear six 
times for election in the course of one year, and if all six 
applications be refused he may then a pp eal to the Governing Com-
mittee whose decision is final. If a member has been suspended 
or expelled he must appl y to the .:~dmission Commit,tee for rein-
statement. nle initiation fee has grown from $15 in 1823 to 
~~20 ,000. There is a trahs fer fee 0 f ~p l, 000. ~he rat es of 
com~ission are 1/8 of 1% of the par value of purchases and sales 
for all principals not members of 'the Exchange. }ates for mem-
bers are 1/32 of 11~ of t'he par value. And in cases where one 
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member merely buys or sells for another and discloses that 
other as the principal, the rates are 1/50 of l~tO of the :par 
value. l\:.l.embers who do business at lower rates are liable to 
be suspended for the first offense and expelled for the second 
·,offense. Any member who fails to fulfill his contract or is 
insol~nt is suspended, but may be reinstated if he settles his 
obligations within one year. The Arbitration Committee, sub-
ject to the Governing Committee, settles differences bet~ween 
members. It is a fact creditable to the institution and to 
the honesty of . its members, that there are few d.isputes to settle Ci 
Most of the produce exchanges are incorporated, and usu-
ally for more general purposes than the Uew York Stock ~cha.nge. 
The Chicago Board of Trade and the :New York Cotton Exchange are 
the two most important produce exchanges. The Chicago Board 
of Trade was organized in April,1848 with nineteen members. 
It was re organized in 1850 and 1859. Its members deal in 
flour, wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, manufactured hog product~ 
flax seed, timothy seed, clover seed, Hungarian seed, millet 
seed, hay, straw, mill feeds, cooperage, and beef products. 
But it is most noted. for operations in wheat and corn. Its 
ob jects are as follows: 11 'J:o maintain a COmY:lerc ial "Exchange; to 
I 
promote uniformity in the customs and usages of merchants; to 
inculcate principles of justice and equity in trade; to facili-
tate the sp, edy adjustment of business disputes; to acquire ~nd 
to disseminate valuable commercial and economic information; 
17 
and generally to secure to its members the benefits of co-oper-
1 
ation in the furtherance of their legitimate pursuits." Upon 
admis sion to the Board of Trade, members sign t he following 
agreement: "We, the undersigned, members of the Board of ~rade 
of the City of Chicago, do, by our respective signatures and 
by virtue of our membership in said corporation, hereby mutually 
agree and covenant with each other, and with the said corpora-
tion, that we will in our actions and d"Salings with each other, 
and with the" said corporation, be in all respects governed by 
and respect the rules, regulations, and by-laws of the sa id 
corporation as they now e~ist, or as they may be hereafter mod-
2 
ified, altered, or amended." 
The Board of Trade has absplute power to discipline its 
memb'ers. Some expelled members have appealed to the courts, 
but the latter have generally refused to disturb the ruling of 
3 ' 
the Board of Trade. The initiation fee has advanced from 
$5.00 to $10.000. Memberships are now transferred at a price 
of about $3,500. The number of members is now about 1,800. 
The Bpard transacts no business of its own, but maintains a 
large Exchange in which its members conduct their bUying and 
selling. Since about 1901 the Chicago Board of ~rad,e has been 
1. John Hill, Gold Bricks of Speculation, p.346. 
2. Ibidem, p.348. 
3.8American Digest, Decennial Edition,p.1628,1906. 
Board of T.rade v. Nelson, 44 N. E .74Z, 162 Ill. 431, 53 Am. z:'.; . 
State Rep.312. 
Board of ~raa.e v. Riord.an, 94 Ill.App .. 298. 
Green v. Board of frade, 174 Ill.565 , 
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eEcept ionally well disciplined [:.nd expulsions and suspensions 
have been fearlessly administered , until to-day it is probable 
that no other exchange in the United States can boast of a more 
strict observance of its rules. The Arbitration committees 
of these Exchanges are very p owerful . Usually their internal 
regulation does not differ wide l y from th [1t of the New York 
Stock Exchange . 
It is hard to conceive of t h e enormous business 
Size of its 
transactions which is transacted upon the Hew York Stock Ex-
change alone . Indeed it may almost be said that 
s peculation directs industry and trade; ~he exchanges occupy 
positions in modern industry equ.al in imy, ortance to those of 
the bank and the factory. Out of ab out $107, 000 ,000 ,000 tot al 
wealth in the United St ates , over ~p35 ,O OO,OOO , OOO is repre-
sented by negotiable securities. The ..I e J York Stock Exchange 
is probably one of the most imIlortant financial institutions 
in the world.. The following quotation gives one an idea of 
the vast amount of business transacted.. 11 In t h e past clecad e 
the average annual sal es of shares have been 196, 500 , 000 in 
number at priceD involving an average annua l turnover of nearly 
. 1 
~?15, 500, 000, 000; bond transact lons averaged ab out $800,000 , 000 . It 
It is .difficult to understand how powerful this one exchange is. 
It i s the money center of the United States with channels lead-
ing into it from all parts of this country, although i t is 
1. Report of Gov. Hughes' Committee, p .5. 
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comIionlJT supposed that its exits are far less in number and 
1 
convenience. Other figures could be quoted, but the fact that 
the shares of pra.ctically all of the companies in the United 
States that have any wide standing are quoted and dealt in on 
the New York Stock Exchange, if their stock has not been storeG 
away as an investment (as has happened to a· number of stocks, 
highly speculative when first issued, ) speaks for itself. 
Stocks and bonds are divided into two classes, listed and un~ 
listed. Admission to the list does not guarantee the eharae-
ter of the security, but it clpes ereate a presumption in . .fa-vror 
of its soundness. To be on the . list, ·the List ing Comrni tt ee 
insists on certain requirements to prevan; frauds. But it is 
not difficult for a powerful speculator to get a security 
listed. Securities not listed may be bought or sold upon the 
Exchange, but they are looked upon as being more speculative 
or risky than those listed. 
The produce exchanges do a. very large business. Speoula-
tion i n them is most.ly confined to wh.eat ,corn , coffee, cotton 
and other articles for which there is an international or even 
world market. Oil speculations have been famous~ Millions 
of bushels are bought and sold in the wheat pit. 3.eported 
sales of futures in whee. t in the New York Produce Exohange show 
an annual average for five years of 480,000,000 'bushels. 
/' 
1. June 6,1910 the gross amount ofneg,otirible s ecurities admitt-
ed. to the N.Y.Stook Ex~hange was 025, 314,429,058. During 
th.e yea.r 190~, sales amounted to ~?20, 000,000,000. The s-took 
~ohange and Money Market, 89, White. 
::!o 
In 1907 sales of futures amounted to 610,000.000 bushels. As 
the annual average wheat receipts in New York for five years 
(1904-1909) were only 21,000,000 bushels the great volume of 
the future transactions is more readily comprehended. It must 
be remembered that everyone of these purchases and sales is 
a contract enforceable at law. As the entire wheat crop of 
the United States amounted to 634,087,000 bushels in 1907,1 we 
see how immense the future transactions are. No record o.f 
fu~ures is kept on the Chicago Board of ~'rade. It has been 
suggested by some, that the reason therefor is the great dis-
erepancy between spot and future sales. However that may be 
tes timony before the Agricultural COIDnlittee of the House of 
Representatives, 1892, relating to the Hatch Ant~ Option and 
Futures Bill, placed the amount as between five and eight times 
as much as futures sales in the New York Produce Exchange. 
Chicago has certainly had a wonderful growth as a market. Its 
total grain receipts (including flour reduced to bushels of 
wheat) in 1901 were said to be 291,252,936 bushels, and its 
total grain shipments (also including flour},226,561,477 bushels\ 
The New Orleans Cotton Exchange is the great market for 
s:pot cotton, but the new York Cotton Exchange and the Liverpool 
Cotton Exchange divide honors as being centers of futures trans-
actions in cotton. Futures sales in New York have grown from 
3,000,000 bales in 1871 to 56,469,000 bales in 1896 when the 
, 
1. The Financial R~view, Annual, 1911,p.49. 
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entire cotton crop of the United States for those two years was 
1 
4,352,317 bales and 7,161,094 bales respectively. Thus in 
1896 the actual cott on crop \'laS sold nearly eight times in the 
New York Cotton Exchange alone . 
Of course the largest amount of this business is s pecula-
tive. There are a few firms on the New York Stock Exchange 
who do only an investment business, but they are very few. By 
far the great majority of the transactions are s peculative, 
and t h is is true to so great an extent that the figures quoted 
are taken as indicating the amount of speculation. 
Now it may be a good plan to explain some of the 
Methods 
of methods of trading. ~lere are several ways in which 
trad.ing 
sales are made. 
1st, cash sales. 
ered on the day sold. 
2d', regular way . 
The securities are paid for and deliv-
The securities are paid for and deliv-
ered before 12:15 :p .m. of the day after the 'sale. 
3d, at three days. The securities are paid for and deliv-
ered on the third day following the making of the contract. 
4th, at buyer's or seller's options . The trans action is 
to be closed at such time as the parties may stipulate, usually 
from four t ·o sixty days after the contract is made . 
About ninety-five per cent of the sales are regular way . 
When a broker receives an order to sell 100 shares of Erie 
- , j • J i $ &. 
1. Report of Commission on Corporation, p.art IV,V,p.27,Z,! 
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regular way, he makes a memorandum of the order, and when he 
goes upon the floor offers to sell 100 Erie. Another broker 
. who has been commissioned to buy 100 Erie hears his bid and 
takes the offer. A nod, raising of the fingers etc, is all 
the assent that is given many times. Each broker makes a mem-
ora-ndum on his pad. of the transaction':' nSold 100 Erie to B @ 78'; 
would be a typical memorandum. At the end of each day each 
broker sends a memorandum of each transaction to the other par-
ty to the purchase or sale, in order to guard against mist~kes. 
It is remarkable that so few mistakes occur in the midst of 
such apparent confU_sion. The smallest unit of trade permitted 
is 100 shares. On the produce exchanges the unit is 5,000 
bushels. There is however a small volume of trade in wheat and 
flax seed in 1, 000 bushel lots. The next day before 12:15 ~~m. 
A delivers 100 shares of Erie to B and receives his check for 
$ 7,800. A then settles with his principal, and gives him a 
check for $ 7,800 less the amount of the commission. B of 
course delivers the stock to his principal after receiving his 
commission on the ,purchase price. That transaction is abs0-
lutely completed. Few persons would ,deny that this is a legi-
timate business transaction. 
Now let us say that Jones thinks the price of Erie is 
Short 
sale. entir~ly too high and that it must soon break. Conse-
quently he tells A to sell 100 shares of ~rie at 78, we 
will say. ! asks if Jones has any :!rie and Jones says, T1I no. 11 
A will probably ask Jones to deposit $780 as a margin to secure 
him against loss. Jones does so and A sells the 100 Erie to 
B at 78. Now we will suppoSe that Jones is right, and that 
Erie goes d.own to 76. A,having been instructed to buy if 
Erie declines two points, does so, and wh en the time for deliv-
ery comes, A delivers to B the 100 Erie which he bought for 76, 
and thus fulfills his contract. Jones of course profits by 
$200 less his commission. That is a short sale, or a sale of 
securities by one having no such securities to sell. Now let 
us suppose that Jones was wrong and that the stock goes to 80, 
and that he has no chance to buy this s tock at 78 or below. 
A then probably goes to at who loans stock, and borrows 100 
Erie to be returned in ten days. In order to borrow this stock 
A must deposit its market value with C. C pays A interest 
usually~ Unless demand for Erie is very great, A will not 
have to pay C for the use of t h e stock. C profits by the use 
of the money. So A delivers eTs stock to B the next day and 
has fulfilled his contraet. Perhaps during the next ten days 
Erie remains above 80, so that on the 9th day A buys 100 Erie 
at 81 and returns to C 100 Erie on the lOth day and receives 
back the market price of Erie Plus t the interest. Wh en A set-
tIes with Jones, he returns J ones t he margin $ 780 less the COID-
mission and less $300 loss. A keeps the interest. This is 
a short sale terminating either in favor of or against Jones. 
ar~ ve~ s~ml1ar . 
Short sales of gra~nAexaept t hat delivery is usually in the , 
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future and A must buy thatlllot" dealt in instead of borrowing 
it. It may be remarked that many merchants make it a common 
practice to sell for future delivery commodities which th ey 
have not yet manufactured or bought. 
Now we will consider a sale for future delivery. 
Futures. 
Jones being a grain speculator, thinks that wheat 
is entirely too high at present and so sells through A 10,000 
bushels for May delivery at $1.05. B has contracted to re-
ceive 10,000 bushels of wheat of A in May and to pay ~plP5 for 
it. No as a matter of fact, one of the big bulls in the mar-
ket is trying to bolster it up and the price is too high. 
Consequently before May arrives, wheat declines, and A buys 
10,000 bushels at $1.03 and delivers to B in Uay, having noti-
fied him t h e day before he intends to deliver. ThiS is called 
sellerTs option, that is the seller has the option of delivering 
at any day throughout the month of May that he pleases. This 
was a typical sale for future delivery- Nearly every producer 
sells for future delivery. In the cotton business, the cotton 
is often sold from the farmer to the spinner in England long 
before it is picked. 
Buying on margin is putting up only a certain per-
Margin. 
centage of the cost price and buying the rest on cred-
it. 10% is a comrrLon margin. Jones must keep that deposit 'at 
.10% of the market price, consequently if Jones has only $ 5,000 
Land deposits it as security ith A and orders A to sell 50,000 
bushels short at ~l.OO, and if wheat climbs to $1.11, A buys to 
protect himself at or before $1.10 and Jones is wiped 0ut, as 
he cannot keep up his margin. As a matter of fact buying on 
margin is just the same in principle as buying real estate and 
paying only 10% down and engaging to pay the rest in the future. 
Pyramid-
ing. 
Let us suppose that Jones orders A to buy 50,000 
bushels of wheat at 31.00 and deposits $ 5,000 with 
A as security. Wheat goes to $1.05. Jones is jubilant and 
( $2600) 
orders A to buy more wheat' using his 5~ a bushel paper profit~ 
as margin to buy 25,000 more bushels. This is called pyramid-
ing, and is a rather dangerous practice, for should WBeat de-
cline six points, ~ones is liable to be sold out as he is not 
keeping his margins up. 
Let us suppose tha t Jones thinks that Erie is en-
Corners. 
tirely too high and orders A to s ell shorl at ·160. 
A does so, but when he tries to find any Erie to de-
liver, A is in trouble. The pri,ae 0 f Erie is climbing steadi-
ly and there is none which can be borrowed. ,In such a' case 1.f A 
cannot find or buy any Erie to deliver, there is a corner snd . 
A is caught. Since the bulls have cornered the stock t h ey can ' 
put the price up as high as they please, and in one of the big-
gest operations on the Stock Exchange in recent years, the 
bulls put the settling pric.e at $1,000. But as a matter of 
faot, the bulls who have bought so much, have ·to sell it at 
higher prices before they can make a 'profit on their. corner. 
... 
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And there is very great a.anger that the market will break and 
leave the bulls with a large f111Pply of stock for which they 
paid dearly. There are not many successful corners. Vander-
bil t secured two successful corners ~ ' Hutchinson manipulated. 
a successful corner in wheat. 
Differ-
ences. 
When it is impossible to secure stock to deliver 
because there ,is none tb get, there must be a settle-
ment by way of differences. That is to say, A pays 
B the difference ' between 'what B makes the settling price. and 
the price that A sold the stock at. On some exchanges some-
times the~over.nmng Committee decides that a corner exists and 
fixes the settling price, but I do not think that this has ever 
happened. on the New York Stock Exchange. There are many sQles 
of stock, however, in :which 'both' parties agree to settle by 
paying ,differences, and to waive delivery. There are undoubt-
edly a large number of such transactions. A typical case 
would occttt if A sold short at $1.06 for fu~ure' delivery to B, 
and if B waived delivery and merely aSked for the difference 
between the selling pr'ice, $1.05, ,and whatever the price rose 
to 'at the time for delivery, say $1.10. This settlement by 
way of differences in the typical oase just supposed, brings 
, .. 
great dieeredi t upon the exchanges ', and gives ris e to the cri t-
icism ~r gambling. Now as to settlement of a fila,: purchase 'of 
wheat' ,' say, . the.re is very strong testimony that the only pE)~81+ 
~ , • 14 
ble way te aV'C'id receiving the ac'tual wheat 'or' warehouse teee(pt 
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(which is the same thing}, is to sell the wheat at the current 
market on or befoEe the day it is tende~ed, and to deliver the 
wheat to the party to whom it was sold at the current market, 
when delivered to the buyer of the May futu~e. 
l~ow when A buys 5,000 blishels of 1:ay wheat of B in January 
he can if he desires have the actual wheat delivered to him. 
But perhaps this is unne.easary and useless. If A receives 
an order to sell 5,000 bushels of T;i:ay wheat in. January and does 
so sell it, it may happen that B is the purchaser. If so A 
and B have bought of and sold to each other one lot of May 
wheat. It would be useless to require actual delivery. A 
might say to B, t1Deli ver me 5, 000 bushels of }lay wheat so that 
I can deliver it to yoU. Il And B might answer, "You deliver 
to me first. II That Yl.op.J.d.]be useless, 80 A pays B $50 which 
represents the difference of l¢ between their buying and 8el1-
ing priees. This is exactly the same thing that is done by 
banks owing each other different sums of money. ': It is the 
, 
economical way of business. Then these two l.'oontracts for May 
wheat would be settled long before l'iay, as we have Seen that 
actual delivery was useless. 
Now it might very readily happen that A buys 5,000 bushels 
of May wheat in January from B, and that B has bou$:p.t 5,000 
bushels of May wheat fromC. Now before Ma.y comes C receives 
an order ,i ·o ·bu.,.Y: ,.5,OOO bushe~s of May wheat and d.oes so, from A. 
Now here we are again whell each of the three "parties has bought 
28 
of and sold to each of the others. So actual delivery would 
again be foolish. This can be extended indefinitely. When 
,such a situation occurs, the contracts are settled immediately 
if both parties are willing tp do so. 'E!t-ther party can demand 
the actual wheat, however, at the .proper time. 
Now having shown when actual deliveries are not made, that 
is when each party has bought -of and sold" to each· of the other 
parties, and when all the parties agree to waive actual deliv-
ery, next we ,will take uF actual delivery. For there must be 
actual del'1very unless the delivery is unnecessary as we have 
seen above • Delivery is usually made in lots of 5, OCC: bushels 
by warehouse reeeipts. As a ,general , rule contracts, in which 
delivery is unnecessary, have usually be'en settled in advance, 
and 'So when time for delivery arrives, all the remaining con-
traGts must be settled by delivery. These warehouse receipts 
are negotiable and pass from hand to hand. 'The ~ellers at 
8:30 a.m. 'on the first business day of the m(i)nth for delivery, 
hand to the buyers notices ' to pay for the:~gr'rLli and receive the 
receipts. Now A who ,has b6t1ght of B IDe.1 " ~ither send B a check 
and obtain the receipt, or if A has ~old grain to X, A can en-
dorse the notice to X , who in turn can do likewise" So tgis 
notice passeS through the h8nds ofnumeto~B different parties 
until it comes into the hands of SOTIe one who desires actual 
wheat. This last person pays for the wheat and obta ins the 
receipt. All the intermediate parties settle by receiving or 
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paying the differences between the contract prices. 
Now we saw that when A and B each had. bought of the other, 
that the loser paid the difference in the prices to the other. 
Exactly the same thing occurs whether there are two parties or 
twenty. The parties having losses pay them, and the parties 
' 1 
having profits collect them. Mr. John Hill has explained 
this method of settlement by a hypothetical transaction which 
is reproduced here. 
A has sold. 5000 bu. () f IfJ.ay wheat to B @ 81¢' 
B has sold 5000 bu. of May wheat to C @ 79¥ 
o has sold. 5000 bu. of M.a~T wheat to D G 82si 
D has sold 5COO bu. of May wheat to E @ 78y! 
E has sold 5000 bu. pf May wheat to A @ 83¢ 
Each party has sold to one party and. bought of another party, 
so that delivery is unnecessary as We saw above. Now if all 
the parties agree to settle the contracts, and they usually 
will do so, the losers must pay their losses, the winners must 
collect their profits. For the ·sake of :convenience a IIsettle-
ment priee ll is named. Mr.Hill took Sosi as the settlement 
price, but any other figure would have done just as well. Now 
A sold to B at 81~, consequently he collects a profit ' of lsi 
from B. But A has bought of E at 83¢'. Accordingly A Jays 
3si loss to E. B bought at 8lst and so pays to A l¢, end sold 
at 79¢ to C, so pays l¢ to C. C bought of B at 79¢ and so 
collects l¢ of B • And C sold to D at 82si, so collects 2¢" and 
. 
having solla.: .to E at 78¢, pays E 2rJ . E having bought of P at 
1. John Hill, Gold. Bricks of Speculation,p.389. 
30 
78¢, collects 'Z(l from D, and having sold to A at 83¢ collects 
3¢ from A. So that each one of the parties settles with those 
persons with whom he contracted, exactly as though there were 
only two parties to the transaction. It ~ill be notio_d that 
the losses exactly equal the gains. This is the way in whioh 
the settlement :by- differences takes place. As has beensaiCi., 
it occurs only when d.eliver~~_::~ is 1IDneoessary, because each of 
the persons has bought of and has sold to another one; and. only 
when, delivery being unnecessary, all parties agree to so set-
tle. Anyone could demand wheat and get it. 
Now, we will suppose that delivery is necessary, and that 
notice of delivery has passed through five hands. A delivery 
price is fixed exactly as the settlement price was, and the 
party receiving the commodity, that is the buyer pays for it 
at the delivery price. If the delivery price be 80¢', and if 
he contracted to buy at 81¢, he pays l¢ to the person with whom 
he contracted, as in the settlement by differences. On the 
other hand, if the price at which he contracted to buy was 7Sy!, 
he collects 2¢ from the seller. And so it goes, proceeding 
throughout the entire chain. The final receiver of the notice 
who desires actual grain, returns the notice to the office of 
... 
the man who sent it out, with a check for the proper amount and 
is given the receipts. This notice is received back again by 
him who sent it out within an hour after deliveries close, that 
is to say by 10:15 a.m. of the same day. When one sees what 
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a tremendous amount of work and expense this machinery saves, 
it seems as though it were quite justified, although these set ..... 
tlements blI way of differences, and clel'ivery by warehouse ' 
receipts have attracted more' ungtavorable attentiom, probably, 
than any o-"ther feature of the exchanges. 
The members of the Board of Trade of Chicago use a 
Clearing 
house. clearing house system corresponding to that used. by 
the banks. A member may have to collect 2¥ a bushel 
from twenty men, and may have to pay l¢ to thirty men, result-
ing, either from the settlement of contracts where delivery was 
unnecessary and the members willing to settle, or from delivery 
by notice. This member sends a statement to' the Bcard of 
Trade Clearing House of the various amounts owed by him cr to' 
be ccllected by him, and the names". o.f the parties. If A owes 
$1000 and desired to collect $500. A sends $500 to the Clearing 
House. Thus by paying cut cne check A can settle fifty aa~ 
counts. These methods of settling differences, delivery by 
notice; and payment to the clearing house are frequently ar-
raigned as being accommodations for gambling on a large sca1e. 
But it must be remembered. how much time and money they 'save. 
Of course it would be possible for actua.l delivery of wheat to 
take place in each case, but the system used has been found by 
long experience to' be the most economical cne possible. The 
'. 
clea.ring house system used by the exchanges ha.s been eommended 
both in Eligland . and in America by Commissions appO'inted. t .o 
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investigate St.ock 'Exchanges. Gbvernor Hughes' Committee in 
New York recommended no change in regar~ to this institution 
1 
of the Exchange, , and the Royal Commission appoint.ed June 9, 
1877 "to inquire into the origin, objects, present constitution, 
customs, and usages of the London Stock Exchange, and the mode 
of transacting business in and in connection with that institlt..-
tion, and whether such existing rules, customs, and modes of 
conducting business were in accordance with law and with the 
requiremen,ts of public policy" etc, reported that the rules gov-
erning the elearing house Were the result of long practice and 
2 
appeared to answer the purpose exceedingly well. 
A matter which is. much complained of is manipula-
Me,.nipula-
tion of tion of prices. Governor Hughes' CommisSion found 
prices. 
that manipulation of prices was resorted to in order 
to make a market for new securities, and in order to make a 
profit on fluctuations planned in advance. They reported that 
the former was unobj .ectionable when not accompanieo.. by matched 
orders, as it is necess,ary .to bring the stock before the public 
in some way. But t~ey severely conde~ed the latter. Such 
manipulation may t ake place without a doubt where the amount 
of stock is small and where most of it is owned by~ the manipu-
lators. But suah a 'stock or security .~s hardly ·8 ,safe one in 
which to speculate~ It is hard to see how manipulation of 
Gov. Hughes' C"nnni'ttee, p.lO. 
..... '" 
Dugu id t Story of Stock Exchange, p . ,264. 
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securities owned by many persons, as Pennsylvania 3ailroad 
stock is, or manipulation of wheat, corn etc, could affect the 
prices very much. Indeed it seems more probabae that mani~u-
lation merely takes advantage of fluctuations in the market in-
stead of making fluctuations. Thos e who work against the ma.r~ 
ket go to the wall, and perhaps manipulators are less wise than 
they are given credit for being. Conspicuous examples are 
Sully of cotton fame, and Leiter the great wheat operator. 
However, it · is Undoubtedly true that there have been gross man-
ipulations of stocks, and that they give a bad name to the 
exohanges. 
Wash sales 
and M,atched 
Orders. 
If manipulation is caused by llwash 'BalesH ' it 
then becomes' a more serious matter. Wash sales 
are fictitious sales. They are forbidden by all 
exchanges and are not enforceable at law. Brokers detected 
while reporting any fietitious sales so that they will a ppear 
on the tape, ar's expelled. This is such a great punishment to 
the brokers that they seldom run the risk o'f it. Such ficti-
tioua sales are strongly to be condemned. Matched orders, how-
ever, are real sales and enforceable at law. If some specula-
tor gives orders to A to sell Erie, and to B to buy Erie, they 
are matched orders. They caUse the security dealt in to show 
greater activity than usual. They are condenmed by many. 
They are really a species of a dvertisement • . Certainly they 
are not open to such severe condemnation as 'wash sales are, for . 
t" 
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the latter are only fictitious transactions. They should, 
however, not be encouraged by officials of exchanges. If some 
one who has secured a large amount of Erie desires to unload 
on the public at high prices, he usually, for his own protee-
tion, gives orders to buy if the market drops. This seems as 
unobjectionable as any of the regular stock exchange transac-
tions. 
There is an option or privilege sold, sometimes, which 
Puts 
and 
Calls. 
is called a .put. The following is a typical I :put I • 
New Ytrk, Feb.l, 19l1~ 
For va.lue received, the Bearer may deliver ~ 100 shares 
o~ the preferred stock of the Chicago Bnd North 
Western Railroad Company at 80% any time in 30 days from date. 
The undersigned is entitled to all the dividends or extra div-
idends declared during the time. 
Witness, G.A~Morse. Signed, George Benton. 
That is a privil·ege or option to deliver or put . that stock if 
the price becomes favorable. We will suppose that A paid $100 
for that privilege when Chicago and North Western was at 82. 
If the stock drops to 79 within the time limit, A will buy 100 
shares and deliver them to the seller of the put, who will have 
to pay to A eo for them. If on the other hand, Chic. & N.W. 
continues at 80 or above, the buyer A will simply not deliver 
the stock and pu,t down the ;;PIOO as lost. ~e most that A can 
lose fs $100, whereas he may gain a great deal. However, it . 
is usually onl~ tn'e s~ller ,of options who makes money. The 
late Russell Sege sold a great many :puts and calls. 
The following is a typical call. 
New York, Feb.l,1911. 
For value receiv.ed the Bearer may 6all on me for 100 , .. ~
shares of the preferred stock of the Cnicago and N'Orth ~estern 
Railroaa Company at 91%,~ny time in 30 days from date. ' The 
bearer is anti tIed to . all dividends or extra dividend·s ae0J..a.r~d 
during the tiBle. ~ , ' ... 
We will ' suppose that A 'bought this call for $100 when Cbieago 
and North Western was at 82. Now if the price goes up to 92 
or abo~e A will eall on Benton for the stock, SRd the ,latter 
will have to buy at a loss. If the stook1doesnlt go to ~91t A 
will have 3:ost $100. So the buyer Qannot: 19s,6 more .. thap. b.e 
pays lor the privilege. It will be seen that a call is the 
exact opposite. of a put. Now a spread o~ s~ra~dle is a CG~bi-
nation of the two. Th~t ie, the Signer sells the privilege 0/ 
receivihg or of delivering the stock. . 9f course a spread or 
straddle is more expensive than s put , or ' ~all. 
These privileges are dealt in on the LondoR, Stock Exe1?-ange~ 
but are against the rules of , almost /,if not all" the st96k ani , 
produce exchang'9,g of the United Stat as. 
Section l~, Artiale IV Bids and' Offers, f?a:rt~ II, Rules> t~r 
the ~ransaction or Conduct ,of Busine.ss; C9net1tution of ·the J. 
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York Stock ~~hange reaas as follows: 
nNo ",bn~l ' to buy or sell ::privileges to rec;eive or tCD de-
liver ,securities shall be made publicly a t the :F1x change unde;r 
penalty of $25 :eor each offense. tI 
This flatly ferbids such transactions .1b;e New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange does not recognize them. They are prohibi t 'ed 
by the Chicago Board ~~ Trade. ' But they have been largely 
dealt in after the Exeh ange closes in the Board of Trade build-
ing. T4e tee1Pimony qf alm~,st all of the members of the exchang 
es, during he.aF'ings b.efore the Agrieul ture Coromi ttee of the 
HOtls.e of Representatives in 1892, and before the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the Senate in considering the Hatch and Washburn 
"Anti Option and Futures Bills l1 ~ H.R. !~99 ana Senate 685, 
52d Congress, was to the effecii that clea:ling in such 0l:>~bns 
and privileges (:puts, calls, and. spreads) was gambl:lihg1', ' ,Shd that 
it- wa.s the earnest desilte of thee:kchange of.fieials to ,sta.mp 
out sueh transactions. No ~pposi tion wa,S off'ered by anyone 
to sections of the bills under consideration .forbidding them. 
If A. sells 10.00 0 bu shels of number 1 northern 
Alterna-
tive 
Contracts. 
wheat, and is called upon for the aetual wheat by 
the buyer, the rules Gf the exchange permit him to 
substi tut e any other wheat higher in grade, if he cannot secure· 
that which he contracted to sell. ' Of course th~' buyer must · 
must :pa.y the diffei'enc'e in value. The same practice prevails 
on the cotton exchang:e, axe'ept that e0tton of a. lower grad.e is: 
substitute4 instead of a higher. 
~ alternative contract. _ 
This is usually called an 
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Heclg1ihg. 
Iiiuch bus iness done on the grain exchanges and other 
exchanges is that which is called hedging. If a 
merchant buys 10,000 bushels of ear corn which will not do to 
shell for several months he usually sells a corresponding 
amount for future delivery, say May. ~hat is commonly called 
a speculative transaction, but it is exactly the reverse. For 
now this merchant. is secure in carrying this grain and knOWE 
exac~ly what his profit ~s. If he kept the grain in his cribs, 
expecting to sell it the next May, that would decidedly be a 
speculative transaction. Or suppose A is a miller who has 
contracted to supply flour in the future. Now he buys wheat 
for future delivery and thus can rest seCU1'e, not fearing · a 
scarci ty \in grain in the future. Expert testimony in the con-
sideration of the Anti Option and Futures bills was to the ef-
fect that there was not a single miller in the country who had 
not sold a bushel for future delivery, ·for every bushel in his 
elevator, or who had. not bought for future delivery to fulfill 
contracts for future delivery of flour. This practice is 61so . 
exceedingly current in the cotton trade as cotton is subjeet ·, 
to severe fluctuations. 
It may be well to explain a bucket shop arrangetnent, 
Bucket 
shops. for it is not a sale. It is generally pretended that 
orders to buy 100 bushels of grain etc. are executed 
by the bucket shop keeper. But sueh is not the ' fact. NO 
order ever given is executed. All settlements are made by 
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J!a:-ment of losses or profits. The bucket shop is the other 
rarty to the bet y}hich is mp.d.e as to the course vlh ich the price 
will take. Price quotations are absolutely essential to the 
ex i s tence of these bucket shops, and if they are cut off the 
shops cannot survive. These transactions are not to be con-
fused, as they frequently are, with dealings on the stock and 
produce exchanges. Many exchanges, inclucling the Chicago Boa rd 
of Trade, New Orleans Cotton kchange, Kilwaukee Chamber of 
Commerce, New York Cotton and ="'J roduce ~changes, have adopted 
, 
rules prohibiting their members froID, in any way, recognizing 
bucket shop keepers in an exchange transaction, and the memb®r 
who handles orders on the exchange for the ~eeper of a bucket 
shop, or who in any way lends assistance to him, is sub j ect to 
expulsion. The bucket shop keeper measures his profits exaat~ 
ly by the losses of his patrons. He charges 25~ comrrl ission -
for dealings in stock on $10 bets. Jones orders the keeper to 
buy 10 shares of American Sugar, and deposits $10. Sugar is 
at ~2 ll0. If sugar declines to $109.25, Jones loses his 'lD~ 
In other words, Jones wages even money that sugar will aditance 
$1.25 per share before it declines 75~. 
Buoket shops have increased rapidly in the last twenty-
five years. They are sure money-makers ,and the men who keel' 
them frequently de~ efforts made to compellthem to conform to 
the law. A few years ago Minnesota was overrun with them. 
Many states make it a crime to operate a bueket shop, including 
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Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, New York, and Massachusetts. 
In New York the keeping of one is a felony, under the recent 
statute of September 1,1908. These statutes, however, Seem to 
make little or no difference to the bucket shop keepers, as they 
are rarely prosecut ed by public o.fficers. A pleasing exception 
to the rule is in Illinois where Mr.C.S.Deneen and Mr.A.C.Barnes 
secured many convictions in 1897. 
The Christie Street Commission Company of Kansas City, 
Missouri, is said to have traded in 157,000,0('0 bushels of 
grain in a year. But this vast amount of business was not in 
any way beneficial to anyone, except the company. The sale 
and purchase of 157,000,000 bushels of grain in the wheat pit, 
would have largely influenced prices, and 80 have helped to 
fix the market. But this gambling transaction ha.d absolutely 
no effect upon the market, for not a single order was ever ex-
ecuted. The quotations from the market were simply Used ' to' 
settle the bets of the patrons and the k eeper. It is to be 
sincerely hoped that bucket shop bets will not be confused with 
speculation on the stock and produce exchanges. If one should 
give an order to a broker to buy 10,OGO bushels of grain, the 
contract would. read approximately as fo l lows: 
New York, Feb.l,1911. 
In consideration of $1 in hand paid, receipt of which is 
hereby aoknowledged, Harris, Gates & Co. have this day sold ~o 
(or bought from) G .• A.Morse 10,000 bushels of wheat, New York 
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inspected, at 90~ per bushel, deliverable at seller's (or buy-
er's) option, May 30,19L1. 
This contract is made in view of and in all respects subject to, 
the By-Laws and Rules established by the New York Produce Ex-
change, in force at this date. 
As We have seen, this co~tract would be executed and would 
perform its share in detenninihg the price of wheat. But an 
order to a bucket shop whuld never be executed, and all the or-
ders handed in to such shops have no influence upon the ma~ket. 
If the price, as reported to the bucket shop, is higher or lower 
the bucket shop loses or wins, according to th~ twrms of the 
bet. In a bull season, when the patrons of bucket shops are 
drawing money from the shop-¥Jeeper, one frequently reads that. 
nSa and So has closed its doors, thereby virtually winning ' wh1e~ , . 
ever way the price goes. 
Although dealing with a ,bucket shop keeper is :in fact (lnly 
gambling, it is only fair to state that some of the marked hos-
tility of the exchanges to the bucket shop, is no doubt due to 
the fact that the latter steeures patronage, some of which 'Would 
otherwise go to the exchanges. 
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EVILS OF SPECULATION . 
. 
Raving examined into the workings of speculation we will 
now consider its evils and benefits, looking at the gloomy 
side first. Undoubtedly there are some evils coincident to 
sp ec~lation, and our problem will be to ascertain how great they 
are, to what extent s peculation performs useful functions, and 
to balance the two in order to see if, after all, s peculation 
is really worth while. If we find tha t the good more than 
makes up for the bad, then, to what extent the evils may be 
curtailed. 
Demoral-
izes the 
public. 
Moral. 
Let us begin with that evil of which we hea r most. 
It is very easy to ti~d magaZine articles, addresses 
etc. which deplore the "tremendous s peculat ive fevex-" 
which is abroad in this country. It is said that some people 
spend all their surplus earnings seeking to get something for 
nothing. Now in many cases, no doubt, gambling in bucket 
shops is meant, but certainly after eliminating that portion, 
there is some truth in the criticism. It seems to be a fact 
that speculation on the stock and produce exchanges tempts some 
men more than they ap~ ear able to resist, and that mem in re-
spo_sible positions fall a prey to thts "fever of s peculation ll • 
rta~ ,. · defal.c~ting bank cashiers lay their downfall to s peeula-
tion on the exchange. There is probably no doubt that men~ 
and women too, spend far more than they can afford in specu1a.t;i.on, 
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and that it has a decidedly bad moral effect upon them~ One 
has only to visit one of the larger brokers T firms, and to see 
there the number of "hopefuls", who seem to make it their bus-
iness to watch the blackboard, to realize that speculation on 
the exchanges has an evil effect upon some of its participants. 
Many of them are well named, 1'lambs!! • They live in a state of 
chronic expectancy, with small and few realizations. But on 
the other hand, many men blame speculation when they themselves 
are at fault. It is probably true that speculation has hurt 
the charaoters of this elass of men, and that it leads " t ,o wor~~. 
Thi~ criticism app ears to be well taken. The attitude of 
those whom President Lincoln called tTthe cpmmon people ll is de-
eidedly antagonistic to speculation, and the reason for this 
widespread hostility, which must be respected as there is gen~ 
erally a sound reason for strong public feeling, seems to be 
founded on this moral evil. It is probably true that specnla-
tion does induee a foregoing of habits of industry and thrift, 
with a consequent bad effect upon character and morality. 
This is a he~~ price to pay for any good that speculation may 
do. 
Defaleation 
not 
prosecuted. 
It is also said that business morality is low-
ered because, sometimes, a defalcator or speeu-
lator with other peopleTs money, is not prose-
cuted for fear that the prosecution would lead to a decided 
lowering of values, as the defalcation would have to be dis-
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closed.., The argument is that this encourages such defalea-
tions, and that this leads to lower business mor~ls. If spec-
ulation does lead to such results, and there seem to be instan-
ces known, it is to be regretted. 
Another criticism is that :qepresentatives and 
Senators 
speculate. Senators :i.:p. , the United States Congress use their 
distinguished positions to make money on the ex-
changes by knowledge of legislation that will be enacted. 
However, this practice has never been generally established, 
probably 
although there areAisolated cases. Such Qets, it is needless 
to sa.y, merit the severest punishment, and condemnation o.f the 
publio. But, although it is an evil attendant u~on specula-
tion, it is hard to See how speculation causes it. 
In so ~ar as s peculation resembles gambling more than 
other bUSinesses do, it is to be deplored. It is · 'easier to 
make and. ,to ·lose money faster than in most other lines of bus-
iness, and this offers an opportunity to those who desire to 
gamble, which probably is the motive of some who operate upon 
the exchanges. There is no doubt that s peculation on the ex-
changes presents more ch&nces to make and to lose money rapidly 
than any other business, due to the nature of speculation. 
lJIany people honestly believe that the mass of stock exchange 
transactions are bets, or only pure gambling. Vie have already 
gone over that, and if it can be shown that ev~n those transac-
tions which are entered into to take advantage of the OI)por.tu ... 
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"\1 
nities offered to q1.1ickly make and. lose money, are l'rodu~tiv~ 
of good, then there will certainly be seen to be some distine-
tion between such speculation and gambling. It is commonly 
supposed that demoraliza,tion of the public is one of the EfV~ls 
of sp~c~lation. To my mind it is probably, ,the worst evil ;~nd 
one which certainly should not be minimized. One of the m0st 
prominent writers on this subject, and ,one who thoroughly be-
lieves that sp~culation accomplishes much good, says tl;at it 
1 
is at fearful · ~-ost J., 
, , t' :Pi~honest Methods ' of Trading. 
Manipu-
lation. 
Another evil much complained of is manipulation of 
prices. We have already seen what manipulation is, 
so that there is no need to go very deeply into it. 
Of oourse its motive is to make a profit by i:rrdlfcing the public 
to~et in a certain way. As far as manipulatio'n .is aCCOID-
plished by personal buying and selling there does not seem to 
be much objeetion to it, and there i s p:r;obably less than is 
generally supposed, afjl , it requires great. skill and a la.rge sup-
ply of C8.1) i tal. 
However, if the manil1ulation takes the form of dishonest 
spreading of false news, influencing financial editors of pa-
pers; wash sales (a man sells to himself etc.), in~l~encing di-
. 
rectors against the best policy for the company et0 j . then it 
is certainlll., an evil and is to be strongly condemned .. 
has been undoubtedly ~uch manipulation on th.e ex.Qhanges. T1+,re 
' . -- #12 
1. H.C.Emery, ':ren Years of ::tegulatiop of Stock Exchange in Gy. 
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is no answer to such criticism. They are evils unmixed witb 
good.. 
Corners. 
Of all the words peculiar to the exchange 1vernacne 
lar, lIcornerTl is prmbably both the most common and 
the least understood. People think of Leiter, Sully, Patten, 
Hutchinson, Pardridge etc, but how few stop to recall the many 
who fail. not It is submitted that corners doAcause as much harm 
as~they are debited with. They require immense capital, mV0h 
nerve, timet patience, and proper conditions. . Although TI e.on·:,. ·· 
ditionsll is named last, it is believed to he the most important 
requisite. People forget that for every bushel or share bought, . 
usually at high prices. there must be a cerresponding. bushel 
or share Bold, usually when the price is going down. When 
corners do succeed t h ey seldom do much harm outside of~l tIU~ s:P·6JCt · 
ulstors themselves. Of courSe some of the l attei ·ga.in . 8llcll: ".:· 
more lose. But any corn er in restra int of trade; manipulated 
in such a way as to hurt the consumer for the benefit of the 
operator, is ob j ect ionable for 1' :: I] sound, economical reasons, -
and it is believed, would not be enfor~ed by the courts, on the 
ground of public policy. 
Another evil, so~ewhat related to manipulation, is 
Floating 
schemes. that of fraud in floating ne~l enterprises. 
promoters hire full page advertisements in t h e large 
newspap ers and magazines . . The adv ertisements contain 'Promis es, 
allttring en Qugh, but unfortunately not founded on fact. Many 
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prospectuses contain promises of very large dividends in four 
years at the very l atest, and a short time ago one swindle was 
run to ground which pledged 10% a month on all capital invested. 
It is quite true that the most honest prospectuses sometimes 
err, and that not all honest expectations are fulfilled. But 
there are frauds issued every year, the promoters of which 
should be severely punished. The recent so-called Elue Sky 
Law of Kansas and its rigorous enforcement are to be credited 
in saving people mB that state money which might otherwise have 
been lost in such schemes. ~e work of the United States 
Postal Department probably acts as a deterrent to such swind-
lers also. It is of course true that the. exchanges are n.ot 
to blame for all of these frauds. 
Some particularly dishonest methods are those used 
r'i:iscella..., 
neous. in the spreading of false intelligence. ~he fi-
nancial columns of some newspapers are probably 
openly bought, and the editors of others may be influenced one 
way or another, perha.ps by nrewards for pas t services " . It is 
interesting to note that some of the very newspapers which so 
strongly condenm s peculation sometimes run full page advertise-
ments of new schemes said to pay very highly. Occasionally 
there is a fraud in listing some stocks with which a wealthy or 
influential oIlerator desires to play upon the Exchange. Such 
practises as these are discreditable and bring much blame upon 
the ExchangeQ. Of eourse they are evils. 
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It should be noteced that all the evils so far considered 
can be classified under two heads, demoralization of the public, 
and dishonest meihods. That is to say, many of these evils 
are those of form and method, and not inherent in speculation 
itself, and, as defects of form, cou.ld in many cases be reme-
died by more strict internal regulation. 
Di verts cap-
ital from 
business. 
E€t0nomic. 
It is said that speculation diverts m'oney from 
legitimate bUSiness or investments, which, in!· 
stea d of being placed wheFe it will produce .8. --
steady, i f s omewhat small, income, is spent in risky stock 
(l ea ls. r::;h e a r gum ent i s that the speculator needs money and 
can aff ord to offer a high rate of i nterest. New the ' banks 
of course are looking for the highest r a tes of interest that 
t h ey can e et i n loans on safe security. Aocordingly, the 
banks loan to s p eoulato r s i ns tead of loanmng to · bus iness men, 
Thus ashort$ge of money is created in business circles. ~hat 
i s the a r gument. Now water will run down hill, and capital 
will s'eek t h e highest returns. As for security, t h e banks de-
mand deposit of collateral with a safe margin, and so think 
themselveS safe. Now those who desire bankers to go against 
their interests by not loaning money at the highest rate safely 
offered, are doing something somewhat similar to the "machine 
who t tl... breakers !! in EQ.gland,tia.t the introduction of machinery in .0 :ue 
factories, Were thrown out of employment, and who tried to 
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retard progress by breaking the machines which worked them a 
personal ha rm although they greatly bene f itted the world in 
general. Now whether t his criticism is true or not, and wheth-
er it is an evil,ilif t~e, ~bout which there may be a difference 
of opinion, the tremendolits amount of wealth in incorporated Se..-
ourities should be remembered. AbGut one-third of the total 
wealth in the United States is in the form Qf securities. It 
takes a larg~ amouht of money to deal in or handle, such a large 
number of shares. Then too , legitimate business which is'" e:xi,.. 
tolled so highly, is quite risky. Indeed it has been calcu-
leted that between 75 and 90% of all business men fail. -One 
answer to this criticism is, that speculation flourishes at e~-
1 
tremely low rates of interest, and not at the high rates which 
11 <1.1 vert capital from bus inees . II When interest is high end 
credit is not good, the public deserts the exchanges. It 
seems that there is at least some doubt as to the validity of 
this criticism. 
Ano t her evil complained of is the waste of capital. 
Waste. 
Upon this point Governor Hughes' Committee reports as 
follows: 
llA real distinction exists between speculation which is 
carried on by persons of means and experience, and based on an 
intelligent forecast, and that which is carried on by persons 
without these qualifications. The former is closely connee~ea 
1. H. White, The Stock Exchange and the Money Market, p.8? 
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wi t h regular business. Vlli ile not unaccompanied by waste and 
loss, this speculation accomplishes an amount of good which 
offsets much of its cost. The latter does but a small amount 
of good and an almost incalculable amount of evil. In its na-
ture it is in the same class with gambling upon the race traok 
or at the roulette t able, but is practised on a vastly larger 
scale. Its ramifications extend to all parts of the country. 
It involves a practical certainty of loss to those who engage 
in it. A continuous stream of wealth, taken from the actual 
capital of innumerable persons of relatively small means, 
swells the income of Brokers and operators dependent on this' 
class of business, and insofar as it is consumed. like most in-
come, it represents a waste of capital. The total amount of 
this waste is rua,ely indicated. by the obvious cost of the vast 
mechanism of brokerage, and by manipulators' gains, of both of 
which it i s a l arge constituent element. But for a continuous 
influx of new customers, replacing those whose loss es force 
them out of the street, this costly mechanism of s peculation 
1 could not be maintained. on anything like its present scale. n 
~his is t h e concluSion of a body of men who made a careful 
investigation of speculation, and whose cha irman was no less a 
person than Horace VI'h ite. It is certain that its view is en-
titled to attention and to respect. Presumptuous as it may 
appear, I am not at all sure that I agree with the above state-
ment . ' In the first place I do not believe that speculation 
1. Governor Hughes' Committee, p.4. 
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carried on by inexI,erienced persons does but a small amount €)f 
good. It is true that it does a. large amount of evil by de-
moralizing the public. Under the division entitled the "good 
of speculation ll I propose to show that thd:.s speculation, even 
though conducted by persons of inexperience, does a consider-
able amount of good. In the second place, I am not sure that 
speoulation is respo:rj.sible for the amount of money lost or won 
by the publio. These losses and winnings are caused by changes 
in economio value of the article speculated in. If A bny~ " 
$10,000 worth of preferred stock of the Union Pacifio Rail,1'0~d'.; 
. , 
takes them home and puts them in a safety vault, and if, owing 
to economic reasons, they decrease much in value, A. has lost 
much money, but is it due to speculation? If A had paid fop 
only part of the price of the stock, and if values had so de-
clined as to wipe out his margin, most people would unhesitst-
ingly say that speculation caused A's loss, but did it? !he 
point that I desire to make is, that this loss is not caused 
by speoulation but by changes in value, whooh would cause 10SD 
whether speculators took advantage of those changes in value or 
not. I do think, however, that the taking advantage of these 
opportunities to make and to lose money by poor and inexpe-
rienced people increases the amounts of the winnings and losses. 
Another pGint that I desire to raise is, whether this Ilcontinu-
ous stream of wealth" is wasted or not? If speculation is 
productive of good, and if this continuous stream goes to help 
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prod.uce speculation, there is a. questi 'on whether tliis is wasted 
or not. A:IJ.y one, I think, would. admit that tI1ere probably is 
waste to a oertain degree in s peculating on the exchanges, at 
least waste as the word is commonly used. 
Another question of moment is that of the effect of 
Criois. 
s peculation upon money crises. It is closely re-
lated to the question of diverting capital from ordinary busi-
ness into speculation by high rates of interest. It is a 
question of so much moment and complexity, however, that it is 
impossible to consider it here. l Mr.Gibson, in his Cycles of 
Speculation, page 63, has pointed out that whenever loans are 
unduly expanded in comparison to depQsits, and whenev·ar the 
per centage of s pecie to loans ·is small, we may look for trouble 
in the financial world. An increase in loans and discounts 
Without a corresponding inerea~e in cash on deposit forecasts ' 
eorning re~ession in business or liquidation ~ It is "probably 
undoubted that high rates for call mone~, and theca.lling of 
loans at critical moments produce many sharp fluctuations. 
A little later an effort will be made to show that speculation 
reduces fluctuations in times of inflation and the accompanying 
following distress. 
Now we come to the main argument used against speculation 
on the produce exchanges. The chief arguments directed 
against speculation on "the stock exchanges ou:f;side of demoltal-
" 
1. Mr. Thomas York of Harvard University is preparing a i;;hesis 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy upon this subject. , 
ization of publie and. dishonest methods, Seem to be diverting 
capital from ordinary business, and waste of .capital. When 
the Hatch and ,Washburne Anti Options and Futures Eills were be-
fore the Committees of Agrieulture in the House, and of th~ Ju-
diciary in the8enate, the chief argument used was that specu-
lation on produce exchanges decreased the price of agricultural 
products to the great detriment of the farmer, ,ana eonsequently 
of the country at large. ThiS Was asserted time after time 
to th~ two e,ommittees., by farmers and others, including Mr.C. 
A.Pillsbury, one of the greatest · millers in the world. More-
over this same assertion was made time after time to the Indus-
trigl Commission when it was investigating the Distribution of 
Farm Products. Also, it formed one of the burdens of ~om-
pla.int, when the Commissioner of Corporations was investigating 
,cotton exchanges in 1907 and 1908. Consequently this argument 
was given specl1al attention by all these bodies. Indeed the 
Industrial ,Oonnnission and. the Commissioner of Corporations de-
voted no inconsiderable ' portion of their ~eports to this 'V@~ 
sub ject. 
Depresses 
prices to 
producer. 
In t h e late 80 ' s and early .gO's the price,s of 
agricultural products were quite low. Times were 
hard for the farmer, and he felt 'he waBn't ge'tting 
sufficiently well paid for his wo rk and produets~ Conseq1\lent-
ly he began "to look about for s ome one to blame" and accordingly 
ca st the b1ame upon the produce exchanges. It was said that -
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selling futures short lowered the price of farm produots, and 
the proof was the price pr-evailing then. In 1890 Hepresenta-
tive Butterwo:t"th of Ohio introduced a bill taxing dealers in 
options and futures 5r/ a :pound on cotton and on all lJ.og products 
and 20cj So bushel on wheat, eorn, oats, barley, and rye. This 
bill failed of consideration by the death of the 51st Congress,. 
In January, 1892, 52d Congress, 1st session, bills of a similar 
nature were introduced by Mr. Hatch of Missouri, ~n the House, 
and by Senator Washburne of Minnesota, and by Senato'r ,Peffer 
of Kansas, . .... The bills were numbered H.R,,£699, 8 ';.685,. and S~ 
1268 respeotively~ H.R.2699 imposed a license fee 0f t;~ 2 ,000 
on dealers in options and futures, and the same taxes as the 
Eutten~orth bill contained. S.685 imposed a license fee of 
$1,000 and the same taxes. Senator Peffer's bill made suoh 
dealmngs felonies, punishable by imprisonment from two to ten 
years. These bills made no distinction between options or 
privileges; and futures, although we have seen that' they are not 
the same. The bills Were ostensibly for revenue, but really 
in order to exterminate dealings in options and futures. It 
is worthy of note that in the investigation which followed, C. 
A. Pillsbury of the Pillsbury Mills, advocated passing such a 
bill, and that it was openly charged by speakers that Senator 
Washburne was acting in the interest of a British syndicate 
which controlled a number of mills in Minneapolis, Senator Wash-
burne's home town. It is also interesting to note that to-day 
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the \7ashburne-Crosby Cold Medal Flour is perhaps the most ad-
vertised flour on the market. 
~he New York Cotton Exchange, New Orleans Cotton Bxchange, 
Boa. rd of r::: r a.d e of Chicago, New York Produce Exchange, and many 
other exchanges issued memorials and protests against these 
bills and sent representatives to the hearings of the Committee 
. 1 
of Agrlculture. ~he hearings were opened (and also closed ) 
by Mr. C. Wppd :0avis of Kansas who proved, conclusively to his 
own satisfaction, that futures were the cause of the low price 
of farm products. He was followed by many others, some on one 
side and so~ e on the other. Not one of the exchanges protested 
aga ins t prohibiting dealings in options or privileg es, but all 
l1 rotested mi ghtily against prohibiting futures. ':'he testimony 
of I.1r. Micha.el Cudahy is worthy of note. He sai~ tha t it made 
no di fference to him whether these bills were passed, but t~at 
a s sur ely a s theJ1 lere, so surely would the farmers receive 
les s f or their hogs or the price of manufactured product's w'Ould 
rise. The representatives of the exchanges indulged in a 
pleasing reductio ad absurdum by ask ing how long before the 
price of wheat Vlould rea ch zero, if the effect of futures 8el1-
ing was to constantly lo~ er t h e price. But the best. answer to 
this criticism is a table showing the price of wheat, which is 
given here. 
v 
1. ~ ealings in Options and ~ltures. Protests~ ~emorials etc. 
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Av erage farm priee per bushel of wheat, December . l of each 
year from 1866 ,to 1910. Year Book Department of Agrieu1tul.'ES 
1909, pa.ge 446 . 
Year Cents Yea. r Cents Yea r Cents 
1866 1 52L7 1881 119.2 189 6 72.,6 
1867 145.2 18.82 88 . 4 1897 80 / S 
1868 108 . 5 1883 91.1 1898 " 58 . 2 
1 BG$) 76 .5 1884 64.5 1899 58 . 4 
1870 94,,4 1886 77 . 1 1900 '61 . 9 
1871 114.5 1886 68 . 7 1901 52.4 
1872 lOJL . Q 188 7 68.1 1902 63.0 
1873 106 . 9 1888 92 .6 1903 69 . 5 
1874 88 '~3 1889 69.8 1904 92 . 4 
1875 89 .6 1890 83 .8 1905 74 . 8 
187 6 96 . 3 l891 83 . 9. 1906 66 .. 1 . '" 
1877 105.7 1892 62 . 4 1907 87Z04 
1876 '77 . 6 1893 53 . 8 1908 92.8 
1879 110 . 8 1894 49 . 1 1909 99.0 
1880 1\6,,1 1895 50 . 9 
It will be n~tieed that the priee of wheat dee1ined from . 
$1.19 per bushel in ~881 to 49# in 1894, a.nd that 92¢ in 18~H3 
was the highest reached between 1883 and 1905. This was indeed. 
a reduction , from the high prices from 1875 to 188~ when dollar 
wheat was oommon. From 1894 to 1903 wheat hung very ·close to 
60f with occasional fluctuations above and below. Sinee 1903 
the price of wheat has stead ily gone up, being 991 D '(\~H~emb 'er 1 
19 09 . This settles t h e argument made that the futures system 
constently lowers prices of farm products . .. , ..r. .' . 
:But this does not answer the question, do future s have a 
tendencz ,to lower prices of farm produete;J! NQW we will an~r: 
) 
1yze a futures transaction and look at its elements. 
';!" ... 
10,00 0 bushels of vheat short for Mny delivery. It is ttue 
that A sells and that sales tend to , lower priees. But that 
one sale does not directly tend to lower spot prices because it 
is a sale for future delivery . But Bbu~s that 10 , 000 bushels. 
So B' s purchase offsets the tendency of .A 's sale to lower fu-
tures prices . Now in r.:"ay or before, A must cover, so he buys 
spot wheat. That certainly tends to raise the price of spot 
wheat . , Qnce more But B sells A that 1)wheat so the two tenCienclas" counter-
act each other. Now what does all this tend to show? Simply 
that however extensive futures trans nctions may be, they do not 
di s tinctly tend to lower or to raiset the prive, but rather to 
offset and counteract , ea~h other. It is interesting to note 
what the Industrial Commi s sion says as to this point. 
nIt is a. mistake to represent speculation in futures as an, 
organized a ttempt to suppress prices to producers. 
"1st. Becaus e every short seller must become a buyer be-
fore he carries out his contract. 
"2d. Becaus,e, so fa.r as spot prices are concerned, the 
short seller appears as a buyer and not as a s~ller~ therefore, 
against his own will is instrumental in raising prices . 
"~d. Because,as far as futures prices are concerned, the 
bull in specula tive buying counteracts the effeots of the spec-
ulative selling of the bear. 
n4th~ Because , the bull in his realizing operat ions whe:n 
depressing prices , is countera-cted by the opposite effeet 0.f the 
o overing Inovf})men,t :ELO l ,t'1ts ) b'~'4~j};(/ th:.' , ;tll 0 & id:est:n:u8 ':, 1te ep'ing ... th~~: ~ ,: 
market pri~e ':j;l>(lut 'whtlre " it " "~Uld b~' ~e:pt', i n th'e '; long run, : !!; , 
• .t " .':~ .; ,t" .; , .. ' : . : ,> ' \ ' , '_ ~ 
instead o'! , bulls and bears , ~\ there ' lfou'ld b'~ , 9rdin~ry l'~gitim8.te 
buyers and sellers. 
"5th~ Because, as has b,een shown, futures sales are nC9t 
made at a uniformly lower priee than the eorrespon,ding , spot 
price, but on the contrary are, on the average ,a" Ii ttle above 
, , 
spot prices , to meet the cost. of storage, inter'est'; ani other 
.' ' 
eha,rges. 
'\I.,. ,. 
the bulls are uniformly on the winning side, but are ab0ut 
equally losers and winners, thus proving that one is abbut as 
important and influential a factor in the market · as the' O'th.:r--. 
-""th. Because -, e'Vide:i:l'ee· believed t 'o be eOng'lt1:Siv~ 'has\ b'~'$il 
pree~nt,ed~ ' showing that und.er ,speeulSttion, :, pr:i 'c:es p/revei liIlg ,,'e:tii ' 
the tim1,' . hen prodneeredispose of the great:elt " part of theiJ7 
. , 
prod.ucts a;~l'~ ~:f$e.ter · in <10inpa:rison to> th-e ,;~t ,of the ye~r ,.'t:fte.n , 
.~ . , " .' '. ',":~" .~ , ",; . 1 
they were before ' the ' 'f.utven1P. -o'! ' modern ~p"~1~t ibn:1I " 
. ::, ','1,'" . 
'l'his seems to ' bear out, th:e aone-iu&ioh ·t:ea1Ohed :~ that) fUture 'S 
have no marked tendeney to infiuenee' ,:pl:~rb'es' o1f farm :prodttettS ';., 
either way. 
Prod:uct'ion of eorn; wJrre'~t ,:', and cotton, >'ana;~: p;J;:e e'S from 'XS6$ 
to ' 1900, 'oopied from ' ::\eport ()f:" ltiiustriS.!r=&~~~,i{;)ll ,.:ra:A,,:p ~ lI4b~~~":; 
'h. . ,!)I:- "," 
1. Report of Industrial Commission, VI,p:.e25. 
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Price Pr .:per Ib 
Year Corn! bushels Pr,ioe Wpeat, bnsh. bush. Cotton!ba1e in cts 
in n .Y. 
1883 1,551, 000,000 42.4 421,000,000 91.1 5,'701,000 10 5/.8 
1884 1,796,~CO,OOO 35.7 513,000.000 64.5 6,575, OCO 10 5/16 
1885 1,936, 000.000 32.8 359, 000,000 77.1 5,682, 000 9 
1886 1,665,000.000 36.6 457, 000,000 68.7 6,254,000 9 1/2 
1887 1,456, 000 ,000 44.4 456,000,000 68 (~ 1 7,020,000 9 13/16 
1888 1,988 ,000 ,000 34.1 416, 000,000 92.6 6,941, 000 10 
1889 2,113,000,000 28.3 491,000,000 69.8 . 7.473, 000 10 1;/16 1890 1,490, 000,000 50.6 399,000,606 83.8 8,653,000 8 5 8 
1891 2,060,000,000 40.6 . 612, oeo , Ul",O 83.9 9.,03$, 000 7 1/4 
1892 1,628, 000,000 39.4 516, 000,000 62.4 6,700,000 8 
1893 1,619, 000,000 36.5, 396, 000;000 53.8 7,493, 000 '7 1/4 
1894 1,213, 000 ,000 45.7 460,000 ,000 49 .1 9,476,000 6 
1895 2,lp1, 00O,000 25.3 467,000,000 50.9 7,161,000 7 ~ /4 
1896 2,284,000,000 21.5 428, 000 ,000 72.6 8,533,000 7 5;16 
1897 1,90~,000 ,oqo 26.3 530,000,000 80.8 10,898,000 5 13./16 
1898 1,924, 000,000 28.7 675,000,000 58.2 11,889,000 5 9/16 
1899 2,078,000 ,000 30.3 547,00O ,DOO 58.4 9,143 , 000 8 3/4 
1900 2,105,000,000 35.7 522 , 000,000 62.0 10,383,422 9 
A glance over the tables of prices of wheat, corn,~d c0tton 
for years past certainly does not show any evidenve of -. 8 marked 
tendency either way. The Industrial Commission has the !'ollow- " 
ing to say in its final report: 
"It is eertain tha t specula tion in future prices doe~ h"ve 
~ 
a more or less int imate eomnection with actual va.1ues of farm pro ... 
ducts, but no evidence has been conclusive enough to show whether 
variations of actual values have been caused by speculative va.-
riations, or whether speculative cha.nges have been the result of 
changes in actual market values. Of farm 11roducts it is proba19l.y , 
hb;rreo:t(~ to say that speculation ~oeB not ~ove.rn prices except;3o 
far as the speculative prices enable the buyer or seller of 'aet-
ua1 goods to anticipate the probable course of prices at· a futur~. 
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time. If this be a fair statement of the weight of evidence, · 
then the speculative market must be . looked upon a.s a buyer's 
barometer, wh ich more or less faithfully reflects the estimate 
of the market. It has not been denied that the producer eon-
sta.ntly avails himself of th~s indicator of values in determin-
1 
ing whether to withhold or to dispose of his crop.11 
This se ems to be strong testimony that the contention of 
the produc ers can not i . ~e sustained. At least no one has as 
yet succeeded in proving that assertion. Certainly the tables 
of prices ' show that futures have lilO marked tendency to lower 
prices. 
It must be admitted, however, that the Committee on Agri-
cuI ture in the Hous e apparently concluded' otherwise, fot that 
Committee reported a substitute bill having the same general 
2 
effect as the original bill. It is rather amusing to note, 
however, that Mr. Hatch cited numerous quot,.ations from daily 
newspap ers of the perniciOUS effects of futures, apparent1y . find-
ing in them, his best proof. 
The Commissioner of Corporations came to about the same . 
conclusions as the Industrial Commissi~n, as to the alleged ten-
dency of the future sys tem to depress cotton priees. 
ports as follo~s: 
Ee r 'e-
TIlt is true that transactions in future contraets on either 
1. ~eport of Industrial Commission, XIX,p.136. 
~. 3045, 524 Congress, 1st sess. ,House of Reps. Report #969~ 
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the New York or the New O~leans eotto~ e~change in any year or-
dinarily represent a volume $f cotton vastly greater than the 
total crop. ..... The greater volume of transactions is due, ' 
in part, of course, to the fact that contracts repeatedly change 
hands during the period from the time that they are entereQ into 
\ 
to the date of maturity. . . . . . It by no meanS follows', how-
ever, that these large sales of futures necessarily depress pri-
, . 
ces. That this is hot the ease can easily be shown by comp~r­
ing the tptal transa~:tions in ·futures on the New York Cotton . 
, , 
exchange for a series of years with the average yearly prices 
of middling eotto~, the price movements for that grade being 
fairly representative of those of the crop as a whole. Such a 
oomparison for the period from 1871 to la97 is presented in ta-
ble 33. 11 Reproduced in Table ·Z. TlTaking 'those years for the 
remaincler of the period, which show extreme changes in the ratio 
of fu.ture ' s~les to the crop, i't will be -seen that the fir$t phe-
nomenal increase in the ration occurred in ' lS?9 when the tota.l 
sales of futures were 501% of the actual crop, or, to use a COID-
mon expression, the crop was Mdealt in five t imes over" on the 
New York Cotton Exchange. In this year of ' exceptional activity 
the average price of middling fell to 10 --83 cents as compared 
with 11.28 cents in 'the preceding year. In the season of 1878-
79, however. for the first time in the history of the cotton 
trade, the crop exceeded 5,OOO,000,bales. In the next year, 
1880, future sales were 591% of a materially increased erop, , 
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Table :3. 
Comparison of average spot prices of middling cotton with 
volume of future sales, New York market , and with cotton crop, 
18'J1-1897. 
Year ending 
Aug . 31. 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1 8 74 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1 882 
1 883 
1 884 
1885 
1 88 6 
1 887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1 891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1 897 
Fut.sales 
New York . 
Bales 
3, 000,00 0 
4,933 ,700 
5,299,700 
6,187,700 
8,358,000 
7,233,650 
10,735,400 
1 2 ,973, 300 
25, 410,600 
34,006,600 
2 8 ,800,900 
33 , 077 , 400 
26,543,600 
24,632,100 
20,889,700 
23,270,600 
26,482,10 0 
25 ,763,9 00 
18,764,800 
22 ,138,200 
24,885,900 
34 ,187,200 
53,245,400 
37,888,400 
39,368,500 
56,469,000 
3 6,113, CC O 
Average 
spot 
price. 
cents 
16.95 
20.48 
18.15 
17.00 
15.00 
13,00 
11.73 
11.28 
10.83 
12.02 
11.34 
12.16 
10.63 
10.64 
10.54 
9.44 
10.e5 
10.27 
10.71 
:}.1.53 
9.03 
7.64 
8.24 
7.67 
6.50 
8.16 
7.72 
Cotton ~ . _ .. :· 'J. elation of 
crop. future sales 
to crop. 
Ba.les 
4,35~,317 
2 ,974,351 
3 ,930,508 
4 ,170,388 
3,832,991 
4,632,313 
4,474, 0 69 
4 ,773,685 
5,074,155 
5,755,359 
6 ,605,750 
5,456,048 
6,9.49,756 
5,713,200 
5,682,000 
6,575,691 
6,505,087 
7,046,833 
6,938,290 
7,472, 511 
8,652,597 
9 ,03 5,Z79 
6,700,365 
7,493,000 
9,901,251 
7,161,094 
8 ,532 ,705 
per cent. 
69 
166 
135 
148 
218 
156 
240 
270 
501 
591 
436 
606 
382 
431 
368 
354 
407 
36 6 
270 
296 
288 
378 
795 
506 
398 
789 
423 
yet the priee rpse !ro"m an average of 10.83 cents ' to l~ .O~ e:ents~ 
If the theory thttta heavy volume of future trading depresses ,has 
any merit, a decided decline instead of anadvan~e of over a 
cent might therefore have been expected in '18S0. In 1882 the 
crop was dealt in ,six times Over on the New York Cotton EXchangeJ 
yet the price advanced from 11.34 cents to 12.16 cents. The 
explanation undoubtedly is to be found in the sharp reduction 
of the crop which fell from acout 6,600,000 bales for the s~aeQn 
of 1880-81 to 5,456,000 bales for the season of·188l-~2. In 
, , 
1893 the ' ratif) of future sales was highest for any yearP.shown;,:' . 
in the table, the crop being traded in nearly eight times ever. ' 
This great activity was a.ccompanied by an advance of O.G cents 
in the average price of mid&ling. Howeverrp the 'crop 'for the 
season of 1892-93 was short, falling 2,335,OCO bales under that 
.... ,I; 
of the previous season. Thus it will be s'ash that PTon'eunee(l 
activity in the ' future market has frequently been acc0mliani ed 
by an advanf e in the prie ,e of spot cotton ' 'inete"ad of by a ; tlJe~ 
cline. Similarly an inactive future market has freque:ntlybe en 
accompanied by a decline. It will be Seen therefore that a 
heavy volume of future transactions has by no means usua.lly b,een , 
accompanied by a decline in the price of cot t on. Indeed the 
table shows that an increase in the volume of future trading has 
frequently been accompanied by an advance in the price~1 
All this testimony tends to show that the evil complained , 
1. Report of Commissioner of Corporations, Part IV,p.272. 
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of does not exist. At least it certainly has not been firmly 
established. It is interesting to look at the matter from the 
other side. Many spinners compla in that the tendency of the 
future system is to advance the price of cotton. s:h e same an-
swer to a lleged tendency to lower the priee to the producer, 
applies h ere as well. In the past ten years of fairly high 
prices, ~roducers have forgotten to complain about the evils of 
t~l1 e future system. Of course no producer thinks of attribut-
ing the cause of higher prices to the future system~ 
Even if producers could establish the criticism that future 
system led to lower prices of farm products, that would not nec-
essarily be an evil. There are many more consutmers than pro-
ducers in the United States, notwithstanding the faet that this 
is a great agricultural nation. ::toughly speaking, about 45% 
of the populat ion is engaged in p ;:" oducing, and 100% is engaged 
in consuming. Anything that would tend to lower the price of 
. 
the necessities of life to the consumer, would be looked up0n by 
many as a bless ing. So I repeat, the opponents of future sys-
tern have not succeeded in showing that the future system has an 
evil eff ect upon the prices of farm products. Even admitting 
t he assertion that the future system lowers prices of farm pro-
ducts, the conclusion does not follOW that this is an evil. 
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BENEFITS OF SPECUMTJ;ON • 
. , £ , _ l ..... , ... . 
Having oonsidered the evils which it is claimed are caused 
by speculation, it becomes a more pleasant task to consider the 
good which it is claimed speculation accomplishes. First , 'the 
two principal arguments which the partisans of speculation on 
the stock exchanges advocate, will be considered, and then the 
two principal argnments put forth by the adherents of sp ecula~ 
tion on the produce exchanges. 
Barometer 
of 
values. 
One very frequently sees ' the statement that spec-
ulation on the stook market f~nishes a barometer 
of values. Now we have seen that exchanges are 
only organiz.ed ma rkets for b~ing and selling. Now When we 
des ire to buy fish etc. what d<? we do? We go where fish are 
bought and s old, and ascertain the price; and if we buy fish, 
we buy it at the fish market, that iS,at the place where 
Expert 
advice trading in fish is most active. , N~w stock exchanges 
free 
are plaoes where negotiable securities are bought and 
sold, where there is a tremendous amount of buying and selling 
sometimes. Indeed on September 23,1911 it was reported that 
stock~ of the United States Steel Corporation alone was dealt 
in to the great value of $550.,0.00 ,000. Any one who wanted to 
sell United States Steel would have gone to the stock market 
and would there have had an opportunity to sell, whether he did 
sell or not. Now what was true of United States Steel that ' day 
is true of every stock every day, only to a less degree. It So . 
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farmer has hay to sell, wha t does he do? He takes it where 
they sell and buy hay, that is to the market, or perhaps he 
ships it to Kansas City, or some other large center, where there 
is a l a r g e market, and where he thinks he will have the best op-
portuni t y to sell it. And why the best opportunity to sell it 
ther e? Simpl y becaus e there is a large market there; that is, 
t here is much buying and selling Qfflay. The ma rket is broad, 
and the more buying and selling there is, the more opportunity 
the re is to sell his hay. 
Now exactly the same principles apply in selling stock as 
a pply in s elling hay. In order to sell, go where there is the 
greatest demand. Consequently the person who has stock f:~ to 
sell will sell it on the stock market; and the more people there 
are who buy and sell, the better will be his chance to sell his 
s tock . That i s t h e reason why I di f fered from Governor Hughes T 
Committee and s aid tha t speculative buy ing by inexperienced per-
sons di d g ooa . 
onen 
It does good - it helps to provide a continuonsA 
ma r ket, it mak es t h e mar ket more active, that is to say, a better 
place i n which to buy and to sell, tha t is it provides a ready 
ma r k et. If you give a man equal opportunities to go to t wo 
markets, one of which has 100 buyers and sellers, and the other 
1 000, t h e odds a re big that the man will go to the bigg est mar-
ket, f or t hat provides more opportunity to buy and sell. That 
is said to be one reason why a town of 40,000 sixty or seventy 
miles frop; j a city of 200,000, does not grow as rapidly in 
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poppGEt1on to its size as does the oity_ Oonsequently I say 
that if the buying and selling of these inexperienced people 
~noreases the market, and it most certainly does, that then this 
same buying and. ' selling by il1exp'sri-enced :pe.ople, cioesgood. 
This a.rgument assumes that s:p~culatiOn is Gn the whole 'beneficial, 
Of course, if the conclusion .. that s]~Gulati,on is on the whole ' 
beneficial, is incorreot, .my minor assertion that speculation by 
inexperienoed persons does gOQ,d, is not pro-ven . And equally, 
o tf course, if tha'f' 0Qnolusion · b-e correct, it n'eee~sa.rily follows 
t~at the minot ·e.see'rti6n is true, as it cannot be d.,oubt(lHl that 
this bUYin~ . and selling broadens the market, and ilh .. at a broad 
market ia a better plaoe in which t 'o buy and to> s~ll than a n3r-
row one. 
It- may be asked why it is an ad-vantage that the market 
should: be brost. One reason is, as w·e· shall see, that a broad. 
apeeule.t1cn j!];Lould. impart greater steadiness to price movements. 
In ord.er to hedt;'esatisfa.ctorrily the market must be broad .. ~cl 
active; and the' grest,er amount of buying and. selling there is, 
the - broader and mo.3:.'e active the marke't ·,beaomes. Now these in-
experienced people eon tribute "Very la'rg'ely · t ,o the vo~ume of ,.> 
trading . Without their purely speeulative transactions the fu-
ture market would be narro'W, and ~y conSiderable hedge , for ex:'" 
ample. would. cause prices to I'luctuat e rapidly. ' Several times .. 
there ' have' been et'f0Tte to ' esta.hlfslt fu.ture ,~ tre.d ing in cotton at 
r.iemphis (l906 ... 07) t M~b-.il~ , Sava,nnah ,.' and Gal"V~ston( 1881 and 1904)t-
At a ll of these ma rkets there a.re 'extensive hedging buying aDd 
selling. At all of these -markets the movement fell through 
because th ere was no speculative business. In Galveston t he 
trad es were restricted to contracts of sales between members who 
wanted ootton for future delivery. The market. without speoula-
tive buying and selling was very active but very narr,ow, and. the 
. 
rea.son a.ssigned for the failure of thes8' markets was beeause 
there was no sp~eulat,ive buying and selling. That is. to say, 
the markets neffi the .broadening influence ,of the elpecnlative 
transaotions of' these inexperienced p eople. 
Now every time, that a sale is made upon the excha~ge, it is 
reported., and the price andnumher of shares go upon the tape of 
the ticker, and ' thence are telegraphed ' all oven ~he United. Stat$s, 
to London, Parie etc. That is to say, ' there is aeQntinuous . 
stream of qtlotat ions of va lues going out t®·. the,ti pn'blio, and these 
quota tions ar e obtained through ' the cla sh and· ~n)tn:promi-8e of two 
, . 
d.ist inct and oppos ing foro es, buyers a nd sellers. . As 'fi~ef£le men 
have ant agonistic mottives, and as some of them have bought ' and. . 
sold many times, they are no mere tyros J ,and the quotati,ons sen:h· 
out afford to everyone int erest ed the sum tota l of exp'ert epin-
ion as to the relations of supply, demand, earning power, and 
all other facts whieh det ermine the Va.lue of the stocks .d'ealt in. 
It is expert· opin ion free. All that one . has to 'd'o in order t.e" 
learn wllat· ,the buy ers a nd sellers of United S:tat~s Ruhb'ir think 
as to its va lue i s to look at the quotations of sales made in 
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that security. And. thus · a prospective buyer or seller ha's the 
great advantage of exp ert opinion free. 
changes act as a barometer of values. 
So it is that the ex-
Finger 
on the 
Wall. 
Perhaps some one will ask, what is the use of all this 
anyway? ~he answer is, this barometer directs aapital 
to the best utility • . ~ Thnt is to say, to the field of 
grea test returns; and the field of greatest returns is the field 
where it is most needed. A hungry man can afford to spend more 
for a loaf of bread than a well fed man, because the former needs 
it more. In other words the exchange is a gi gantic hand upon 
the wall of modern times, pointing out to cap italists "vh 'ere the 
investment of their money is most needed. If it were not for 
such a barometer which reveals the true relations of supply and 
demEmd to a s tud,ent of the exchange, much money might be s pent 
in promoting a new railroad where none is needed etc. 
All t hat has been said holds true of produce exchanges a1:so, 
except tha t the market directs t h e distribution of product,S and, 
co rnrnodtLties to t h e places where t h ey are most needed, instead or 
capital. If 1l.'li eat is lO~ higher in Chicago than in St .. Louis t 
then wheat i s sent almost automatically to Chicago to satisf.y 
the gr eater demand for it there. It is lik e Vlater finding its 
level. Ylhea t goes 'where it is most expensive, t hat is Jhere 
there is greatest demand for it. ~his seems t o me to be a g:t$'at 
ser vice which speculation upon the stock and produce exchanges 
performs. 
It is a means of forec~st ing prices. . Under modern cendi-
tiens it is neces sary te make many contracts to deliver goods 
in advance 'Of the time of delivery. Speculat ion in futures 
greatly facilit a tes fixing prices for suOh contracts. ' The fu- ' 
ture queta tion means tha t the opinion of men who a,esk to blow 
all f acts lik ely ' to affect the future pri68, is that 'the future 
price v. ill be ~hat the quotation of futures now is. Without 
suoh quotatiens a cotton merchant, for example, would pr,Gbably 
have grea t diff iculty ,in naming his ,futur e prie'e. 
Equa lizes 
meney 
pres sure. 
It is said that speculation on the stock exo4snges 
equalizes the pressure in money. 1 By this is meant 
that if the United Stat es needed go ld, speculation 
weuld seoure it. That is, that gold would come pouring into 
the United States by the sale of United. ~tates se0,~r it' ies a-t " ~ 
low figure abroad . The best example of t11;is is "Fra"nce &1.~/, :th~ 
A I.:obility 
to 
Capital 
1,000 ,000 ,000 e.r indemnity demanded by G~:rma.Iit.t 
. ' , 
a£ter the war of 1870. F.ew e~:pect ed, that Fr~'<!Hp 
I' . . 
would be able te ~ay this t~emendous indemnitY · in 
the shert time granted . Now , France for years had bought. 9~"" 
ourities , and particularly many foreign en~a, B~ t.he sale o.f 
her foreign securities at a cemparatively speaking, lew I'a..t~, 
France obtained the tremendous sum demand~d , and paid itr Wl't,tl,in 
the short time specified. 
eter 'Of values poi:o,ted to a. large su~ply a:t a .~~m;parfL,tiv'ly :.,'" 
cheap figure j and money fle'JJed in the direction pointed OU~i-'" 
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r.:oreover, li'ranoe pa.id this great indemnity without any convlll-
sion. What elae could she have sold to obtain this suntin ::;ru~h 
a short time? This case shows how easy it is to s~ll stocls. 
There Beems to be no doubt that speculation makes capital mobile. 
It would :)e hard to find a way tim which capital could be sent 
to the direction in which it is needed, as easily and economi-
oally as it is now. 
Faoilitates 
oredit. 
everywhere. 
We have seen how easy it i s to sell stocks. It 
is equally easy in ordinary times to borrow money 
on stooks. 
And why? 
Collateral security is recognized 
Because there is a gre~t market for 
these negotiable securities. We all know how hard it is to 
sell real estate, even a t a loss, sometimes. But any time that 
one desireA to sell st ocks it can be done on the market .• Xee:p-
ing a market open for instantaneous us e is one a f the thing·s , 
\vhich specul tiOD does. We have all seen how speculation i~: 
real estate provides buyers. It does on exchanges too. But 
fortunately, it i s held in check on the exchanges by short sel-
lers. There are no short sellers in real est at e spec.ulations, 
end s o inflation is not kept down and is followed by period of 
depression, so that the real estate market is open only part of 
the time. So it will probably not be disputed. tha.t specula.tion 
faoili t a t e8 ered it by providing a broad, ready market foI' 001-:-
l ateral aeour1ties. A speculator helps to distribute invest-
menta among those who ean afford to hold the securities perma-
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nently, f or t he income they produee. Many of the most solid 
a nd stable stocks of to-day hav e, in days past , been speculative, 
Arnone these are Bell 'l'el ephone, U ew York Cent.ral etc. 
It is s a id that the Jewish race became the money lenders 
of ~rope b ecause t h ey ea rly, through necessity, learned the 
need of putting their wealth into co~odities which could be 
t rans f e r red fr om one to another, that is neg'otiable, and which 
could b e sOld . readi1y. If that is so , it throws a passing 
light on t h e va lue of a continuous open market . It is a func.-
tion of the tock market t o provide stocks and bonds with neg~­
tiability. That is to say, one who has securities to sell,can 
sell them , and one who des ires to buy securities can buy th,em . 
when he d esires to. This possibility is l a rgely due to speeu-
lative buying and selling , for that brings many buyers and se.ll-
ers together . This argument as to equalizing mon ey pressure 
and t h ereby making it easy to buy and sell cornmodi ti es and stocks, 
and to borrow money on them, giving mobility to capit~l, and 
tending towards the expansion of credit, Seems to be a sound one 
It follOWS na turally in the wake of the barometer of value argu-
ment, but is not such an important one, to my mind. 
Leaving these arguments claimed by the advocates of specu-
lation on s tock exchanges, e will consider the arguments of the 
advocates of speculation in produce exchange8« NoW, her~ the 
test of utility is~ does such speculatjon perform service to 
t h e producer or consumer? That is, does such speculation tend 
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to reduce the price paid by the consumer, or increase the price 
paid to the producer, or does it lower the difference between . 
what is paid to the producer and by the consumer. 
In 
general 
Aot~ ae a Buffer. 
It is frequently said that specula.tion relieves traq.e 
of the risks Qf fluctuation. What is meant is that 
the inevitable risk of economic changes in value of 
~ • l 
securities and oonnnodities is shifted from producer and consumer 
to a special class of risk takers, known as speeulators. S:pe~-
ulatore are willing to buy or to sell at the market price ., .and. 
so relieve produeers of the necessity of holding th~ir good~. 
This allows producers to use their capital in production, . ~nd .. 
relieves them of the necessity of reserving a portion as seeu-
rity a.gainst inevitable changes of value, due to different COll--
di tiona of SUPI)ly and demand etc • Now what are these ~ risk$1 
The risk of distribution is a great one in marketing agricul- · 
tural commodities. And how does thespeQulator aseume this , 
risk? He buys the conm:odity when offered for sale and distrib-
utes it to the consumer. Or if there is a gltlt in the market 
and the consumer wants no more a.t present, the speeulat'Qr as-
oumes the risk of carrying over the commodity until it is needed 
~he8e are the two great risks whioh the speculator in agricll1-
tural pro.ducts e.ssumes, the risk of change ' of value, and that of 
distritrntion • . Thus we see that both produe~r and consumer are 
freed from these risks, and that they ar e assumed by this 
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N~w' the Brit-ish 
government evidently thinks that s,peculators perform this ' 8e-:r-
vice accept~bly, for even in India~ which is subject to grea.t 
famines, supplies are distributed by speculation. This shows 
rather well that practical experience has found that speculative 
distribution of supplies is more effieient than bureaucratic 
distribution would be. A strong contrast is shown in ~ussia 
where the government has assumed part of the risks of ' Grop dis ... ' 
tribution. 1'here, it v~as reported to the Industrial Comm'ission, 
piles Qf wheat r<Qt in one section while people starve 'in: the ' 
1 
next. This seems to show that speculation distributes' pro-
duots properly. It would seem that speculation w~Hl.ld :point the 
way where the supplies were needed most, better th~n any way 
which has as yet been devised. ' The Industrial Commission came 
to that conclus ion, as it made no recomrnendat ioh rela.tri~e i, to 
legislative action on this point, and as it said,"It ca.nnot be 
shown that the prOducer is the victim of an 1!mecQ1l.olnica.l Syst@ID 
of grain distribution. n2 
Some one may ask why the producer could not do this just as 
well as -the speculator. When the speculator assumes -this -fune-
tion of distributing Burplus commodities Over defieit times~~d 
pla.oes, he relieves th-e producer and also the co'nsultier of mu~h 
uncertainty. When the producer ha.s produced his erop, .1 he wants 
" to be at liberty te go beak and raise snother cr0~. 
, 
1. Report of Industrial COMniSsion, VI,p.29. 
2. Ibid~m. 
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is tha.t true, but the eonsumer wants to be able to buy his flour 
every week in every month and not have to buy all of it at one 
or two periods of the year. Besides , as a gener~l rule the 
producer must have money and wants it right away. He. is enabled 
to sell his entire crop for cash as soon as he has harvested it. 
Not only this, but sUPIl ose theIS's were no speculative buying or 
selling. ~hat would mean that the entire crop would be cast 
upon the market at the same time, and that there would be a great 
glut, resulting in much lower prices. Then, several mon~hs 
later When the supply would be low, the price would go ~p much 
higher, and so both producer and consumer would have reason tp 
As it is now, speculators take care of the er~p and 
oarry it, and prices in the month of May are not very different 
from those of August and September. 'This is the service t4at 
the s peoula tor in agricultural products p erforms. Thus it is 
seen tha t he is a sort of insurer against risks. It would seem 
then, tha. t speoulation in the produce exchanges acts as an ineur-
ance .' against wild fluctuations, and. makes production more s'teacly 
tha.n it otherwise would be. 
~hat is to say, speculation acts as a buffer between 
Hedg-
ing. the producer and the market. "Wall Street discounts 
everythingll is a dell known saying. Some recent mo~e-
menta in st.ocks tend to prove the truth of this statement ,. 
I mmed.iately after reaiproci ty was defea.ted in Oana.da, . Sejt . 2 ·~ ~ ". 
1911, ~rices of wheat, eorn etc. rose quickly several points, 
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showing that reciprocity was ' regarded as a measure which would 
reduce the price of wheat to the producer. About the same time 
it was suggested that Attorney General Wickersham was b eginning 
legal steps toward the dissolution of the United States Steel 
C<brporation. I mmediat ely the common stock fell five points, 
and the preferred stock as much. The German market broke about 
Sept . 9 ,19l1 in ant icipat ion of war with Franc;e over Morocco, and 
some stocks fell off 15 points. 
the market became much firmer). 
(On the following day, however, 
Now it is largely due to this 
very habit of di sc ountdng in advance that specul ation tends to 
make production safer and more even. Hedging secures an easy 
rest · to many who otherwise would be on an uneasy seat. Hedging 
transfers s peculat ive risks from nonspeculators to the specu-
" 
lators. A merchant receives an order for 5,000 bales of mid-
dling cotton at 7¥ a pound from a spinner, desi~es to pr0tect 
himself, and to mak e a profit. So he buys' 5,000 bales for fu-
ture delivery . Now this transfers the risk of speculative loss 
and a l s o risk of speculative profit to the speculator who sells 
this cotton to the merchant. If the price of spot cotton,which 
the merchant will need with which to fulfill his contract with 
" 
the spinner, advances, so will the 5,000 bales for future deliv-
ery advance in price. Consequently if he loses on the spot 
cotton furnished t h e spinner, he sells out his future at a cor-
responding profit; and, if value of the future declines, 50 will 
the v alue of spot, and so he makes up for loss on future, when 
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s old, b~ the profit on spot cotton. Of course this hedging 
secures him and enables him to calculate exceedingly close prof-
its, this being a benefit to the consumer, for otherwise the 
merchant would have to charge the s pinner more to insure him-
self against rise i n price of spot cotton, and the spinner would 
prob ably have to char g e more in order to insure himself, and 
so t h e consumer would have to pay more. 
h edging is offs ett ing a los s by a gain. 
The principle of 
So long as price of 
spot and future cotton etc. move in harmony the risk is reduced 
to a minimum. Of course anything that disturbs the sympathy 
between the two price movements is dangerous and productive of 
evil. Anything t hat tends to impair this very important func-
tion of speculation in the produce exchanges is to be guarded. 
aga inst. This is a seemingly speculative transaction, ~nd yet 
it really is just the reverse, As it reduces the risks to the 
hedger, by s o much does it reduce the margin which he will have 
to make i n order to mak e a profit. As for the speculators, 
t hey assume this risk as one of t h e reasons for their existence. 
This is a very common transaction; indeed it has been said that 
it ' is universal. It is a part of the business of merchants, 
spinners, elevator men, manufacturers of hog products, and those 
who mak e contracts for t h e future delivery of such products, to 
g o short upon the Board of Tr ade, exchang e etc. an amount COr-
responding to tnat purchased as raw material. yithout this 
shifting of risks, the miller etc. would have to ask a greater 
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margin on his finished product, and this would raise the prioe 
to the oonsumer. It can readily be seen that this hedging nar-
rows the margin of profit between the producer a,nd consumer, 
and so is of great benefit. 
In 
general 
Keeps Prices Steady. 
The next argument made is that speculation in eommod-
ities keeps prices steady. That certainly sounds 
reasonable, for, if speculators did not carry the eom-
modi ties, there would be a great amount thrown upon the markert, 
at onoe and prices would go down. Then, wh'en the demand '"Qe-
. 
came greater than the supply, the price woulQ go up and so fluc~ 
tua tion would be extreme. The tendency oft the future system 
i s to keep the prices nearly the same all the year round. 
Professor Emery made a table comparing" th'e averag~" monthly 
prices of winter wheat in New York for four years before, and 
for four years after the advent of speculation (future sys>tem ~ . 
, ' 
This table is ' ,'! o 'a:pied: ~. here ~ :r;t seems to show that ~uetru.'a.- " 
. tiona have been less extreme since the advent of spec'llla~io'n in 
commodities, t han before. In the month of July beforespecll-
1at ion prices ranged from $1.04 to $&07 1/2, a fluctuation of 
For the corresponding month after specu.lation th'ey 
r ang ed from 99 7/8 cents to 71 1/16 cents, or 28 13/16' cents ~ 
. ,. 
The l a r gest fluctuation for t he four years after 'the advent of 
s peculation was 42 15/16 cents. , The smallest before speeula-
tion was 47 cents. From the amount of fluctuations columns 
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Taele 4 • 
. 9 
Comparison ' of average monthly prices for winter wheat in 
New York for four yea rs before and four ~Tears after the advent 
of speculation. 
. ' in. " 
Copied from EL C.Emery,,,Report o'! th,~ Indus t r ial 
Commiss ion, VI,I' .195 ~ Speculation ,on , $t oeks ~'~a'nd Produce Ex-
I ,,. 
8hanges of tIle United States, p .127, Columbia University Studies 
v.7. 
Month 
July 
Aug. 
S "'~ pt . 
Oet. 
Nov . 
Dee. 
Jan . 
Fleb. 
Iilarch 
April 
May 
June 
Aftlt.of 
fluct. 
Month 
Jan. 
Feb . 
r~:ch . 
Apr. 
TL.ey 
June 
July 
Aug . 
Sept . 
Oat . 
Nov. 
Dee . 
Amt . of 
f1uct. 
' " 
Year Amount of 
1855-6 1856-7 1857-6 1858-9 fluctuation 
$2 .07 1/2 $1.55 $1.75 $1.04 
1/2 
$l.O~ I/.2 
1.80 1.57 1.55 1.15 .64 1/2 
1 ; S5, 1.55 1.40 1.18 .67 
1.93 1.56 1.17 1.11 1/2 .Sl 1/2 
2.08 1.B5 1.19 1.16 "90 
2 . 05 1.57 1.17 1.1811. . 8,8 
1.95 1.67 1.12 ", 1.2t3 '1/ 2 .'e3 
1.83 i·55 l·l? 1.36.1/Z .66 
1.70 1.46 1.15 1.4$ .5,5 
1.64 1.45 1.17 l.47;3/4 .47 
1.60 1.65 1.04 ,1 •. 6& .' \ .61· 
1.45 1.70 1. 0~ 1.55 1[4 .68 
' -
.63 .25 .73 .61 
, , 
. . :{ear Amount of 
1890 1891 1892 169,5 fluetuatiG>'n ' 
$ . 86 l/S 11.05 3/4 $1.02 3/9 ,, $ •• 9 1/2 $ . 26 1/4 . 
. 85 I/.4 1.10 11/16 1.0~ 5/8 .. , .79 3/.16 .31 ' 1/.2 
. 87 3 Z 4 1 .13 5/S 1.01 ' .75. 7/. 8 ' . 5" 3 /4 
. 93 3/.16 1.19 5/16 .98 1/2 , .76 3/8 .42 15/~6 
.98 3/4 · 1.13 7'/S .96 1/2 ' ~77 3/,8 ,.136 I/.2 
.94 l/S 1.07 1~/16 .91 1~/16 .72 1/16 .~~ ,3/4 , 
. 93 3/16 .99 7/.8 ' . 86 3/.1& . ~l 1/1'0':' . ~6 1'1;/16 
1.04 1.05 7/8 , .,82 l/S .66 f; , , .27 71. ~ , 
1.01 15/16 1.03 5/16 . ; 18-' 3 /4 . 7~ .1:1/.;· ,;51 '1;/16 
1 . 06 l/S 1 . 04 1/4 , ' . 77 13/16 . 6 9 :~} /3, • '/J 7 
1.02 3/.4 1.05 "13/16 '.'75 ,,,,/8 . • 66 'Ole ~ Z9 'l;116 ,n 
1.04 1[6 1.05 7L16 .76 )./2 .?7~(S , .38 5j16 
• 20 3 /4 .19 7 /16 • 28 3/4 . 12 9 /16 
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(Which I took the liberty ·of acIding to Mr.Emery's table, for the 
sake of convenience), the larger fluetuat·ions before ad.vent of 
speculation are readily seeu. 
After speculation the largest fluctuation from month to 
month d.uring the year was 283/4 cents, whereas the smallest 
before speculation was 25 cents, and ,the largest 1]3 :cents. So, 
compared from any point of view, fluctuations appear much wi1d-
er before speculation than after it.· But as eight years is 
not a long time from which to draw general eonelusions over a 
long period, a larger table is here eopied from the report of 
the Industrial Commission, VI,p.193. 
In Teble, 6, giving the avera.ges from 1885 to 1900, the 
average of the entire §i£teen years is given first. The sec-
ond ave r'age is tha.t of fourteen years eXQluding 1897-98, as that 
was a year of exceptionally h1gh priaes of wheat, owing to Mr-
Leiter's op era tions in the wheat pit, and it was believed that 
excluding thS.,t yea.r would lead to mOTe true t results . . '" 
that the average of twenty 'years is compared with th~t of ·'f'i.f-
, 
teen years is not believed to be imp:ortant, <, CQmpa:r111g these 
two tables we See that the o..i fferene'e · between theav"erage of 
, " .,.,f, j' 
the month of February before spe~nlation and the a;v~,:rage of the 
'.... ~ 
month of Aueuat, is 18 1/f; cenitst .w.nich -repre~,ent'Sl " the wiidest 
, ,'~ _ '.' .: 'f.f 
fluctuat iOllS. It is ' certainly r.'e~f3 :&nable t~ ~~:rup~~~ . that wheat 
u ~ (. 4. ~ .... r ' ~ 
would dec,line in August as · th'at i 's , t~·,grea,;1j .• tk~tlng. month.. 
~~ "':': ' 1 :,,,:~,t", l' , 
Turning to prices after spee:ulatioll t'" and :,'Mng the ftftee-n year 
, ~ r ~ ~.".'" ...' : . 
.so 
Tmble 5. 
Average prices of wheat' per bush~l in New York on firs1 
day of each month. Compiled from report @f Secretary of 
~reasury , 1863. 
Year Jan. Feb. 
1840 $ 1.06 $l:'86 
1841 1.035 1.01 
1842 1.25 1.25 
1843 .85 .875 
1844 1.00 1.025 
1845 1.025 .975 
1846 1.31 1.25 
1847 1.025 .1.525 
1848 1.25 1~275 
1849 1 .. 225 1.,275 
1850 1.25 1.275 
1851 1.20 1..20 
1852 1.09 ' 1.125 
1853 1.32 1.325 
1 854 2.04 2.425 
1855 2.575 2.50 
1 8 56 2.14 5 2.125 
1 857 1.75 1.75 
1858 1. 3 75 L.37 5 
1859 1.40 1.45 
Av erag~ 
, 
1.366 1.4'15' . 
Year July _: Au.g,. 
1 840 $ . 9 65 I l .06 
1841 1.375 1.276 
1842 1~275 1.125 
184Z 1.19 .S15 
1844 .90 .. 95 
1845 1.00 .925 
1846 .985 1.10 
1847 1.46 .90 : 
1848 l.035 1~225 
1849 1 .275 1.025 
1850 ' i ~49 1~D3 
1851 1 . 9f..6 1.0.'85 
185a,~" . :? ~, ~: 1 .12!) 1.345 
1853 ' l.2,9 2.375 
1854 2.Z0 
1855 .; 1.62-5 
1856 1.55 
1857 1.g25 1.826 
18$8 1.226 1.225 
1859 
Aver~ge 1,.303 . 1.'23 
Mar. Apr. May June 
$1.075 $1.10 $ 1.04 $ 1 •. 01 
i.025 .95 .975 1.075 
1.275 1.255 1.225 1'.295 
.845 .925 1.025 1.05 
1~055 11.0i4 1.09 ,.965 
1.00 1 102B ~) 1.025 1.05 
1.20 1.2..15 1.075 .985· 
1.585 1.,425 1.50 1.925 
1.30 1.,385 1.275 1.16 
1.345 1.225 1.245 1.235 
1.28 1.29 1.335 1.50 
1.15 1.125 1.145 1.0S 
1.14 1.10 1.095 1.12 
1.28 1.23 1.315 1.29 
1.975 1.99 . 2.25 2.45 
2 .60 2.70 2.775 2.80 
2.015 1.95 1.775 1.44 
1.75 1.625 1.875 
1.40 1.375 1.325 1.225 
1.525 1.475 
' i '59}:'! 'I ,~ 2' "372 ' '. 5t. lijNl ' i I . ':l} ~'9'6' ' ., . . .. ~ .. . ~  . . ... ' . . 
. Sept • 
$~L.12 
l~ ,40 
I t 02 
l ~ OI 
~·e75 
~95 
.825 
1.15 
. 
, Oct .. . N~'Y':' ·. De:e., 
$-lCO~ , :: tlc ,op, " $.1.005 
1.-42fr , l-.,~~ 6 1.~25 
~925 .:S5 .945 
~ ~45 ' ~975 1,025 
.87 l ~OO ; .975 
:925 1,225 1.355 
1.10 ' 1~07a 1.076 
l~lO' 1.31 ,1.2.6 
1~125 1.085 1.05 
1.265 1.21 1.305 1.82 
1~135 l ;16 1.135 ' 1.16 
1.00 l i OOS .945 .99 
1.125 l;\ eS ' 1 ~l15 ,l ~:~15 
1.401 ' 1~~4 1~ ~45 1·~75 
2 .17,5' 1.''(G5 2 .· e~-S 2: "~7' 6 
2.0Q5 2.04 1~£i ' 2.20 
1 .. 52'{) 1 ,,!Sf) 1: ~ '8'9 " i .. V05 
1."6'$6 1 ;;30 1 ~475 1.475 
1.26 1.425 1.3S 1.40 
1.~O ._ . 1 ,,~tr / ,1,, ' ·5 . 1 ~ 4; 6 
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Table 6. 
Price of #a Spring Wh eat in Chicago, per bushel in cents. 
Compiled by Bureau' of Economic Research, New York. 
Year 
1885 
Jan. Feb. March April May June 
1886 80.88 79.88 'II! 56: 76.44 75.75 74.25 
• 7 
1887 78.69 75~31 76~ 80.19 84~81 79~69 
18~8 77. 75.50 74. 76~38 85.19 82.38 
1889 97.06 100~75 100.56 89.06 81.88 78.75 
1890 76.31 75.38 78.38 83.75 94.88 88.62 
1891 91.62 95.31 98.88 107.38 103. 88 96.75 
18922 87.50 87.94 83.44 81.19 82.88 82.88 
1893 75.12 73.94 76. 79.25 72.25 65.06 
1894 61.12 51.50 57.56 60.62 56.12 57. 
1895 51.94 50.75 53.62 58.69 71.06 75. 
1896 61.3~ 66.62 65.44 66.12 62~38 60.31 
189 7 71~ ' 74.50 73.50 71.50 72.38 70. 
1898 99.56 101.50 103.38 112.25 151. 97.50. 
1899 71.25 72.12 70.25 73~06 73.94 75.25 
1900 -;6T2~.7~O~~6~5~.3~4~. __ ~673~.8~8~. __ ~6~3~.9~6~. __ ~62~.~' 2~5~· __ 7~6~: .~9~O 
Av'ge 76.60 77.49 76.88 78.66 82.09 77.36 
Av'ge 74.96 75.77 74.9~ 76.2977.1~ 75.S~ 
• ~ e . ~ \ ~ , . Q . • j -. .. p ., $ U t 
Year July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov .D~c· . 
1885 87 . sa . 83.50 81.50 87 . BB 87 .19 86. 3 ill. 
1886 72 .12 76.88 74.62 72.19 74.75 77.44 
1 88 7 68~66 68.12 69~50 7Q.75 74.12 77.25 
1888 82.31 87.75 77.50 110.19 108.75 101.75 
1889 80.88 77.12 79.19 80.06 79 : 94 78.38 
1890 . 89.50 98.43 100.12 99.81 94.5~ 90.44 
189189.67 100 .12 95.38 95.75 94. 91.44 
1892 78. 77.06 73.12 72. 71~38 71. 
1893 60. 32 59.62 66.19 63.38 60~8a 61.81 
1894 54.38 53.94 52.75 51.39 53.69 54.88 
189A 66.44 63.88 58.69 59.56 57. 56~75 
1896 58.25 58.06 62.50 73.38 82.69 83.86 
1897 73.50 88. 92.50 90. 94.25 96~ 
1898 76.8S 70.25 65.38 66~12 67. 66.38 
1899 72. 71.75 72.25 ,'71.5i5 65.69 63.75 
1900 ~~~--~~=-~~~--~~~--'~~~tM.~~ 
Av'rg 74.39 75.6'3 74.75 77.60 77~73 77~16' 
Av'rg 74.45 74.75 73.48 76.55 
,""," ". 
75.62 . .. . 
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average, we find that the wildest fluctuation is 7.65 cents 
between the months of May and July" which are the highest aria 
lowest prices respectively. This is less than one-half the ' 
fluctuation before speculation. Now using the [ourte,en :vea): 
~ .' 
a.verage we find that the wildest fluctuation was only 3.64 cents 
the highest and lowest months being May and September respec-
ti vely. ~his is very much less fluctuat ion than b afore spequ-
letion, being, indeed, less than one-fifth the fluctuation be-
fore speculation. Whichever average we use, we see that t ,here 
has been a marked increase of stability in prices since S:p@cu-
lation. Now, without doubt, great perfection in methods ()£ 
communication and transportation have had an impror:1ii{ia.ut er'fect 
on fluetua t ,ions, but, equally wi th.out doubt, if s peculation has 
not also had some effect on fluctuations, it is a very peculiar 
coincidence. No one would say that speculat ion was responsible 
for all the increased s teadinesS exhibited in prices of wheat, 
but it is f a iI' to say that some of this increased. steadiness in 
price is due to the advent of speculation. 
Now having examined the fluctuations in wheat, let us ex-
amine the fluctuations ip corn and see if we find the same re-
suIt. Wh eat i s largely exported and its price is more or less 
determined by the world market, whereas we USe almost all of the 
oorn grown in the United Stat as, and its price is t~erefore more 
nearly regulated by production in the Unite.a. sta.tes. Now the 
fi gures which I have been able to secure in the :teport of the , 
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Table 7 ~ 
From the Year Book of Department of Agricu1ture,1909, p .43 5. 
Chicago Cash Price of J 2 Corn per bushel in cents. 
Year 
1866 
1867 
J.JOW 
5~ 
61 
1 8 68 S8 
1 8 69 56 
1 8 70 41 
1871 3 6 
1872 27 
1873 40 
1 8 74 64 
1 875 40 
1 876 40 
1 8 77 41 
18~8 30 
1879 39 
1 880 35 5/8 
1 881 58 1/2 
1 082 49 1/4 
1 883 54 1/4 
18 84 34 1/2 
1 085 36 
I D8 6 35 3 /4 
l S8 7 47 
1 888 33 1/2 
1 889 29 I/.4 
1 890 47 3/4 
189 1 39 3 /S 
1 892 40 
tS93 34 1/4 
1894 44 3/4 
1895 25 
1 89 6 22 1/2 
1 89 7 
1 898 
1899 
1 900 
1901 
19 02 
1903 ' 
1904 
19 0 5 
1906 
1907 
19 08 
1909 
25 
33 1/8 
30 
35 1/4 
62 1/2 
4 3 3/4 
41 
43 1/2 
42 
40 
57 liz 
56 3 /4 
62 1,/2 
December. 
High Margin 
62 9 
65 4 
58 20 
67 11 
59 18 
39 ·3 
28 1 
49 9 
76 12 
4 7 7 
43 3 
49 8 
32 2 
43 1/4 4 1/4 
42 6 3,/8 
63 1/2 5 
61 11 3 /4 
63 l/S S 7/S 
40 1/4 5 3/4 
42 3/4 6 3 /4 
38 2 1/4 
51 l/S 4 l/S 
35 7/S 2 3 / 8 
35 5 3/4 
53 5 1/4 
59 19 5'18 
42 7 /8 27/S 
36 1/2 2 1/4 
4 7 1/2 2 1/4 
26 3 /4 1 'lJ 14 
23 3/4 1 ~/4 
27 1/2 2 1/2 
38 4 7/8 
31 1/2 1 1/2 
40 1/2 5 1/4 
67 1/2 5 
57 1/4 13 1/4 
43 3 /4 2 3/4 
49 5 1/2 
50 1/4 8 1,/4 
4 6 6 
61 1/2 4 
62 1/4 5 1/2 
66 3 1/2 
I'I:ay of following year. 
Low High r~~argin Average Mar .. 
64 79 15 n +2 glll 
61 71 10:· "'7 
44 51 '7 13 1/2 
73 S5 12 11 1,/2 
4 6 52 6 12 
38 43 5 4 
34 39 5 3 
49 59 10 9 1/2 
53 67 14 13 
41 45 4 5 1/2 
43 56 1~ 8 
35 41 6 7 
33 36 3 2 l /e 
32 3/s 36 l/S 3 3 /.4 4 ' 
41 1/2 45 3 1/2 4 7/16 
69 76 7/8 7 7!g 6 7/16 
53 1/4 56 3 /4 3 1/2 7 5/8 
52 1/2 57 4 l/Z 6 11/16 
44 3/4 49 4 1/4 5 
34 1/4 56 3/4 2 1/4 4 1(2 
36 7 / 8 39 3/e 2 1/2 2 3/8 
54 60 6 5 1/16 ' 
33 1/8 35 3/8 . 21/4 Z 5/16 
32 3 /4 35 2 11; 4 
55 69 1/2 14 1/2 .' 9 7/8 
40 3 /4 100 59 lZ4 39 7/16 
39 1/2 44 1/2 5 ~ 15/16 
36 3 /4 38 1/2 1 3/4 2 
47 3 /4 55 1/2 7 3 /,4 5 
2:1 1,/2 29 1/2 2 : I.., 1 7/8 
23 25 1/2 2 1/2 1 7/8 
32 3/s 37 4 5/S 3 9/16 
32 1,/2 34 3 /8 1 7/8 3 3/8 
36 40 1/2 4 1/2 3 
42 5/8 58 1/2 15 3/4 10 1/2 
59 1/8 64 3/4 5 5/S £) 5/16 -
44 46 2 7 7/S 
4 7 1/4 50 2 ~/' 2 3/4 
48 64 1/2 16 1/,2 11 . 
47 1/2 50 2 1/2 5 3 !S 
49 1/2 56 6 1/2' 6 1/4 
67 3/4 82 14 I/.4 9 l/a . 
72 1/4 76 3 3/4 4 7/.§ 
3 l,/E: 
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Department of Agriaulture range only from 1866 and do not give 
us the long view pr evious to the Civil War which was oqtained 
in the wheat figu.res. However, I shall give these figures, 
although I do not think that there is. much of value on this 
point to be deduced from them. T:tLere was some Ii tt 1 e trading 
in futures in 1860, but it did not become general until ,later. 
It was not until 1879 that it became of any 'great im~ortance 
oompared to the cotton crop. We shall compare the ,average of 
the first four years and o~ the first ten years with that of 
the last four years and of the iast ten y~&rs, and that from 
1880 to 1909'l I took the liberty ot a.d.ding the s'everal margin 
, ,., 
colunms in order to be in a better position to compare fluctua-
tions. It is readily seen that fluctllations have decreased 
somewhat sin~e 1866. The average of th.~ , fi:rst four years is 11, 
and the average of th·e first ten years is 9.1. NOVi the ave t-age 
of the last l our years is 6 3/16, and the average of the last 
ten years is 6 121/160. The average of the period from 1880 to 
1910 is 6 Gl/96. These figures seem to show that fluetuations 
in the price of corn have also grown smaller since the specula-
tion beaame prominent. But less value can be given to these 
figures because they do not extend sufficiently far before the 
advent of speculat ion to give us a true average for that period. 
But they se~m to inaicate a tre:nd similar to ' that which the 
wheat prioe .figures indicated, smaller fluc)ttations. It is 
interesting to note that the figures for the last four, ten, and 
thirty years show nearly the same. 
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Ta.ble 8 . 
1ecord of monthly spot price movements i n lTf?W Orleans mar-
ket, comp iled by Henry G.Hester , secretary of I\" ew Orleans Cot -
t on Exchange. Commissioner of Corporat ions,1909,Part IV, p . 29 5. 
Extreme fluctuations i n price of mi ddling cotton at Rew 
Orlea.ns , moi11lhly, Sep temb er , 1827 t o August 1909 . cents ller Ib 
Crop 
Year SeE · , Oct . Nov. Dec. Jan . Feb~ Mcll, Apr . 11ay Jl,lne July Aug . 
1827 
; , 
28 . • 50 . 50 . 50 1.00 . 75 .50 1 . 50 1 . 25 1 . 00 . 50 1.00 . 50 
T29 . 50 . 75 . 75 . 50 .7-5 .50 .7 5 . 50 . 25 . 25 
130 . 50 . 50 1 . 00 . 50 .50 . 50 .7 5 7h • :J .7 5 
C - ~l . 75 . 75 . 50 . £5 1.00 . 75 . 50 1 . 00 . 25 . 85 
1 f) - N . 25 . 50 . 75 1 . 00 . 75 . 50 . 50 . 25 . 50 1. 75 ,75 1 . 25 
8 - 3 . 25 1.00 1'. 25 .75 . 50 . 25 " 78 .: . \ ' 1 . 00 1 . 25 . 75 . 50 
3 - 4 1 . 00 3 . 50 1. 50 .7 5 l.50 1 . 00 '1.00 . 50 1.00 . 50 .50 
4 - 5 . 50 2 .00 2 . 50 2 . 00 1.50 1.50 . 50 1. 00 1.00 1. 00 2 .50 1 . 00 
5- 6 . 50 . 60 1.50 1 . 50 1.50 1 . 00 2.00 1.50 1. 50 . 50 . 50 
6- 7 2 . 00 2 . 00 1 . 00 1. 50 1 . QO 3 .00 2 . '00 
7- 8 . 50 1 . 00 1.00 . 50 1.S0 . 50 . 50 . 75 . 75 .75 . 50 
0- 9 1 . 00 3 . 50 1 . 25 1. 50 1.25 2 . 00 1 . 00 1. 50 1 25 ~ 3 . 00 1. 00 3.50 
9 - 0 . 50 . 75 2 . 00 1 . 25 1.25, '1.00 1.00 1.00 1.,25 .7 5 . 60 1. 00 
40 -1 1 . 00 1. 25 . 50 . 25 1.00 .50 .7 5 . 75 . 50 . 75 . 50 . 25 
1 - 2 ~25 . 50 . 50 . 75 . 50 . 50 . 75 .7 5 .7 5 . 50 1. 25 1 . 00 
2- 3 1.60 1.25 . 50 . 75 . 75 . 50 .7 5 . 75 . 75 . 50 . 50 . 50 
3 - 4 1 . 75 . 75 . 63 1.87 .76 . 88 1 .13 1 . 25 . 88 .63 . 63 . 75 
4 - 5 . 25 • fie . 62 . 75 . 62 . 50 1.13 . 50 . 50 . 37 .:12 .12 
5- 6 . 50 .7 5 . 50 .63 . 37 . 50 .63 . 25 .62 . 25 . 63 . 5{) 
6-7 . 25 .7 5 . 38 1.25 1. 88 2 . 25 1. 25 .50 . 60 . 87 1. 50 " Z5 
7- 8 . 63 3 . 00 1 . 12 . 38 . 38 . 38 .73 1 . 50 1.00 . 50 ~50 . 62 
8 - 9 . 50 . 50 . 37 . 50 1 . 00 . 50 . 50 . 50 1.25 .87 2 .'50 1 . 00 
9- 50 1 . 50 1 . 00 . 50 . 50 1.38 . 62 .88 1.00 . 75 .75 1 .00 . 62 
50-1 .7 5 1 . 13 . 38 . 87 1 . 25 2.38 1.75 1.87 1.38 ~7 5 1.25 1.00 
1-2 1 .12 1 . 50 1.00 .75 . 88 . 88 .62 . 50 1 . 50 .75 . 50 . 50 
2- 3 .50 . 50 .7 5 1.12 1/00 . 50 . 62 1. 00 . 75 . 25 . 75 . 50 
'3 - 4 . 75 1 . 76 1.00 . 50 . .37 .7 5 1.00 1.50 1.00 .75 1. 00 . 5.0 
4 - 5 . 38 . 62 . 62 .75 .75 . 25 . 87 1.25 1.75 1.50 1.00 . 62 
5-6 . 37 1.13 1 . 25 .88 . 75 . 75 . 50 1. 50 .62 . 87 . 50 .25 
6-7 . 75 1 . 25 .63 . 63 . 62 . 62 . 75 . 50 .50 .50 .75 . 50 
7-8 1.25 5 . 00 2 . 25 2 .75 1.75 1.50 .75 .75 . 50 .75 . 50 . 25 
8 - 9 . 60 . 88 .63 .50 .25 . 50 1.,12 .63 1.25 . 75 . 50 . 25 
9- 60 . '15 .62 ,,60 . 37 . 6~ . 50 .75 .50 . 50 1.00 . 50 .. 75 
60-1 . 25 1'1 3 7 1 . 50 2 . 25 1 . 25 .62 2 . 00 1. 00 '!50 1. 35 1. 00 1.00 
1-2 
2- 3 
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Yea r SeJ2 • Oot . nov . :Dec . Jan . Feb. :Mch. AEr. Mat) June Ju l y A~ . 2- 4 7 . 50 8 . 25 3 . 00 3 . 00 9 . 00 4 . 00 7. 0 16. 0 7 4 55 . 0 23 . 0 18: 
4-5 £9 . 00 5 . 0 16 . 0 1.0 . 0 29 . 0 7 .• 0015 . 0 6. 0 4 . 0 10 . 0 6 .0 4 . 00 
5- 6 1 . 0 12 . 00 6 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 7 . 00 2 . 00 5 . 00 5 . 00 2 . 00 1. 00 
6- 7 4 . 00 5 . 00 4 . 50 3 . 00 1. 50 1 . 50 2 . 00 5 . 00 4 . 00 1. 50 2.50 1. 50 
7-8 5 . 00 1 . 50 4 . 00 1 . 00 3 . 50 6 . 00 3 . 75 6 . 00 4 . 00 2 . 00 2 . 50 2 . 00 
8-9 5 . 25 2 . 76 1 . 00 1. 50 3 . 50 1. 75 .-75 . • 50 . 50 3.50 . 50 
9 - 70 5 . 50 1. 00 2 . 37 . 63 1 . 75 1.75 1. 25 . 75 1 . 00 3 . 00 2 . 00 . 2 5 
70 - 1 2 . 75 2 . 00 1 . 12 . 88 . 88 .7 5 . 87 . 37 1. 88 4 . 37 . 75 
1 - 2 1 . 75 1 . 75 1 . 00 1 . 25 2~50 . 50 .75 . 63 .62 1 . 25 <) <") 5 1 . 0e (.., . G 
2;:;5 3 . 25 . 75 1 . 00 1. 00 . 62 . 50 1 .00 . 75 . 25 . 50 .12 . 25 
3 - 4 2 . 50 2 . 87 2 . 25 1 .13 1. 00 .50 1 .13 1 .12 . 62 . 87 . 25 . 25 
4-5 2 . 25 . 62 . 37 .37 . 88 . 87 . 37 · . 50 . 62 . 50 1 .13 .50 
5-6 1 . 50 . 75 . 25 . 13 . 25 .13 1 . 00 . 88 . 62 . 3? . 13 . 88 
6- 7 . 50 . 75 1. 00 . 75 . 63 . 50 . 88 . 62 . 50 . 63 . 25 1. 00 
7- 9 1 . 00 . 63 . 38 . 38 . 25 . 1D . 62 . 25 .7 5 . 25 , . 25 . 38 
8- 9 . 62 . 87 . 62 . 87 . 25 . 38 . 50 1.13 1.75 1.B7 . 87 1 . 00 
9- 80 1.50 1 . 00 . 75 . 62 . 37 . 50 . 88 . 50 . 50 . 50 . 37 
80-1 . 87 . 50 1 . 25 . 37 . 25 . 25 . 50 . 38 . 37 . 25 .as 1. 25 
1 - 2 . 38 . 50 1 . 25 . 25 . 25 . 38 . 50 .13 . 50 . 38 . 37 
2 - 3 1 . 12 . 87 . 37 . 31 . 32 . 31 . 25 . 50 . 25 . 52 .25 . 12 
3- 4 .68 . 50 . 50 . 31 . 26 . 19 .69 .62 . 25 . 38 . 31 1. 25 
4 - 5 1 . 00 . 50 . 31 . 44 ~32 .19 .13 . pO .31 . ~· ~O .es .25 
5- 6 . 37 . 38 . 63 . 25 / 29 . 50 . 50 . 25 .19 1t9 . 25 
6- 7 . 50 . 69 . 12 . 44 .18 . . 25 .93 .32 . 25 .. 31 ~'-94 . 31 
7- 8 . 32 . 38 . 25 . 19 .13 . 07 . 50 . 12 . 37 . 38 . 50 
8- 9 . 37 . 50 . 68 .12 . 25 . 25 .19 . 69 .1~ . 13 .. 12 . lZ 
9 - 90 . 63 . 62 . 32 . 06 1. 06 . 31 . 31 . 69 . 32 . 44 . 19 . • 45~ 
90 - 1 . (;0 . 37 . 13 . 32 . 37 . 31 . 12 . 38 ~ 07 . 37 .19 . 37 
1-2 . 50 . 44 . 50 . 50 . 38 . 38 . 25 .62 .. 19 . 44 . 19 . 6}£ 
2-3 . 50 .37 .50 . 38 . 44 . 44' . 69 . 78 . 38 •. 5¥7 . 31 .ez 
3 - 4 . 88 . 50 2 . 19 . 43 . 44 . 38 . 18 . 31 . 25 . 25 . 25 .19 
4 -5 . 81 .56 . 31 . 26 . 19 .. 19 . 82 .63 . 81 . 37 . 2 5 1.13 
5-6 1 . 19 . 88 . 62 . 44 . 19 . 50 . 43 . 12 . 37 . 57 . 31 1.19 
6-7 . 50 . 50 . 57 . 69 . 12 . 50 . 25 . 62 . 25 . 25 . 18 . 63 
7- 8 1 . 00 . 63 . 31 .13 . 19 . 44 . 31 . 25 . 37 .12 . 25 . 31 
8- 9 . 50 . 19 . 25 . 25 . 56 . 25 . 37 .12 . 19 . £5 · . 18 . 19 
1 900 . 75 . 19 . 31 '. 31 . 50 1 .12 . 44 . 37 . Q9 1 . 00 . 37 . 87 
0-1 1 . 75 1 . 57 . 56 . 56 t;1. 8 . OJ . 25 1.12 . 31 . 44 . 69 . 31 . 94 
1-2 . 69 . 87 . 88 . 68 . 19 . 38 . 38 1.19 .62 . 37 . 43 . 32 
2- 3 . 44 . 38 .19 . 44 . 44 1 . 00 . 32 . 44 1 . 50 1 .. 94 1 . 00 .7 5 
3 - 4 2 . 6 3 1 . 12 . 37 2.13 2 . 94 3 .19 1 . 62 1. 43 1.25 1. 69 . 63 1.13 
4-5 1 . 19 . 69 1. 31 2 . 06 . 37 '~ 75 . 50 . 31 1.31 1 . 56 1.38 / 32 
5 - 6 . 44 . 94 . 87 .75 . 56 .32 .75 . 31 . 44 .32 . 50 1. 44 
6- 7 . 25 1 . 69 . 88 1 . 25 . 31 . 19 . 43 . 88 1 . 00 . 50 . 50 . 81 
7- 0 2 . 06 1 . 3£ 1.75 . 75 . 87 . 50 . 88 . 69 1.. 56 . 50 1. 00 1. 25 
8- 9 . 19 . 25 .7 5 .25 . 75 .19 . 25 . 87 . 81 .6,2 1. 13 . 37 
1 
Now th'8 Commissioner of Corporatiens made a particular 
study of the fluctuations in cotton for a long period of years, 
and the figures copied here represent the longest period yet 
g iven. His tables of fluctuations by cents from month to 
month from 1827-28 to 1908-09 are given first. Then in order 
to conveniently observe the results he brought together in a 
t able, a lso copied here, the number of times thonoughout the 
year tha t the price fluctuated 2rj or over, ana l~ tp 2rj, 2a{a 
of its va lue and 10-20% of its value, comparing thirty-three 
years from 1828 to 1860, and thirty-three years from 1877 to 
1909 inclusive. The comparismn shows that in the thirty-three 
yea rs before speculati6n, fluctuations of 2¢ or more occurred 
twenty-two times, or in twenty-two different months, whereas in 
the thirty-three years after s peculation, such a fluctuation 
occurred only eight times. Fluctua ~ ionsof lrj to 2rj occurrel 
115 times before, to 52 times after specul~tion. The percellt-
ages show about the ' same relation, there being a fluctuation of 
20% or more 20 months in the thirty-three, years beforespecul~­
tion, and only :5 a.fter speculation ; there 'was a fluctuation of 
10% t ,o 20% 118 times befone, to 56 times after speculation. 
As t h e report then proceeded to pO,int out, this certainly s,eems 
to show what we should expect from the theory. of the problem, 
tha t is,. that fluctuations s-hould beeome less after the ad:vent 
1. Report of Commissioner of Corporations, 1908 ,Parts IV ,V,p. 299. 
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of specula,tion than they were before. These figures"--- are in 
accordance with our wheat and corn figures, and the evidence 
is rather clear that fluctuations have decrea"sed since the ad-
,~ t' 
vent of speculation. These three commodities, : wheat , ' , coril. \~ , 
and cotton, ar e three of the most important commodities specu-
lated in, antI they are three of the most s.peculative ones. 
Upon examining this table close'ly, and by decades (table 10) , 
one notes how much fluctuations increased from 1901 to 1910. 
This was not the case with the corn figures, as We noticed. 
The Commissioner of Corporations lays the blame to the adoption 
of the fixed difference system in October, 1897, by the New York 
1 
Cotton Exchange mostly, and partly to excessive speculation, a 
conspicuous illustration of which was the IlSully campaign l1 in 
1903 to 1904. 
There is no doubt that fluctuations have become less wild 
in prices of corn, wheat, and cotton, since 1870. And if they 
have in these three commodities it is probable that they have, 
likevlise, become less violent in the prices of oth er cOrnr.1odi-
ties dealt in on the exchanges. Now whether the praise for this 
should go to speculation, is another question. Undoubtedly 
the telegraph, cable, and railroad services have ha.d something 
to do with this, how much We can only guess; and that is not 
worth while. On the other hand, it seems fair to give part 
of the credit to speculation. It needs no argument to show what 
1. :1eport of Commissioner of Corporations,1909, Part IV,p.306. 
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Table g. 
-
Commissioper of Corporations,1909, Part 1'1,p.299. 
Comparison of frequency of monthly fluctuations of state.d 
amounts in price of middling cotton at New Orleans, 1828-1860, 
and 1877-1909. 
Crop Crop 
year Fluctuations of year Fluctuations of 
ended 2¢ 1¢ to 10$b to ended 2it Ii to 10% ,to 
!u~l. or + 2i 20% 2016 Aug.31. or + 21 20~ 201b 
1828 0 5 0 3 1877 0 2 0 0 
1829 0 0 0 '. 0 18'78 0 I 0 0 
1830 0 1 0 1 1879 0 4 0 3 
1ffi3!"]. 0 2 0 2 1880 0 3 0 2 
1832 0 3 0 3 1881 0 3 0 3 
1833 0 4 0 3 1882 0 0 0 0 
1834 1 5 1 3 1883 0 1 0 1 
1835 4 6 0 6 1884 0 1 0 0 
1836 1 6 0 4 1885 0 1 0 0 
183'7 4 3 2 :3 1886 0 0 0 0 
1838 0 3 0 3 1 887 0 0 0 0 
103 9 4 8 3 6 1888 0 0 (') 0 
1840 1 7 1 '7 1889 0 0 0 1 
1841 0 3 0 3 189 0 0 2 0 0 
1 842 0 2 0 5 1891 0 0 0 0 
184 3 0 2 1 6 1892 0 0 0 1 
1 044 0 4 2 6 1 893 1 0 1 1 
104 5 0 1 1 5 1 894 0 0 0 7 
1 846 0 0 0 1 1895 0 _ 1 0 3 
1847 1 4 1 4 1 89 6 0 2 0 0 
1 848 1 3 ! 4 1897 0 0 0 2 
1849 1 3 1 4 1898 ' 0 1 0 1 
1850 0 5 0 ,3 , 189 9 0 0 0 3 
1861 1 7 1 6 ' 19 00 0 2 0 4 
1852 0 4 1 6 1901 0 3 0 2 
1853 0 3 C 3 10 0 2 0 1 0 5 
18 54 0 6 0 6 1903. 0 4 0 6 
1855 0 4 0 5 1904 5 6 :3 5 
1856 0 3 0 " 4 l~Qp 1 4 1 1 
1867 0 1 0 1 1906 a 1 0 3 
1858 3 3 3 2 1907 0 4 0 4 " ~ '7 
1 859 0 2 0 1 1908 1 4 0 0 
1 860 .JL. 1 ~ 0 1909 ~ ,, 1 . ' ..JL. 0, 
33 y r s 22 ' 115 20 lie 33' yrs 8 52 5 55 ' 
~~b.le l O. 
i c 
COIDrrlissioner of Corpora tions, 1909, p .30l~ 
Before specula tion. 
Decade " 
JL.831-40 
1841-50 
1851-60 
1 881-90 
1891-1900 
1901-10 
0 
1 
"l 
., , 
FluQ:tua tions of 
1- 2 20 0" or + 
Months Months 
48 7 
27 8 
34 5 
• 1 .,. g. \ . 
10-20 0 
t':Qnths 
39 
41 
34 
.afte r s peeula.tdron'. 
. e .. 0 15 
6 1 18 
28 4; 28 
a g reat benefit this is to all parties concerned. 
90. 
Cott on. 
, 1 ~.I"'~ •• 
It means 
that it t akes less capital to insure against these risks, and 
more capital can be used in production, with the added oonse-
.. 
quence of decreasing the final cost t o the consumer, and of nar-
rowing the margin between producer and consumer. 
On e influence to steady priees is the greater breadth o~ 
~ " 
the mar k et since s peculation became prominent_ That is. as has 
. . 
b e en pointed o11Lt before, t h e greater number of purchases and 
s a les there are, the less likely the chances are for strong ad-
vances or declines. If there l'!ere few buyers and sellers, ea.ch 
tr~n8aation would affect the market more, that is the price 
would fluctuate more. The old saying that Wall Street discounts 
eve rything, has much truth in it. Everyone on the market is 
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constantly looking out for facts whi~h. will affect future prices. 
And a s Soon as they become known to anyon~,he i mmediately acts 
on the knowledge, and so when the evenjrs . ,do occur, the market 
is p repared, the effect has been largely discounted, and specu-
la.tors are hunting for more fa.cts w;h ich will a.ffe·ot the market. 
This tendency to gather news and act on it, 'breaks the sudden-
ness of those events which caUSe wild fluctuations, and so this 
tends to steady prices.' There is no doubt b~t that, since . . ' 
speculation, loea ldifferenees in prices have largely been done 
awa.y with, with the exception, of course, "of 'thetransportati0n 
cha.rge whieh vl[ill remain, althou.gh ,it has bee·n lessened 'from 
time to time. This is partly due, no doubt., to far better 
means of corrnnunication and of tra.nsportation ·. · It is reasonable 
to suppose that there will be less differeneebeUleen priceS' at 
different times as well as at different places', although' 0/ 
course the , fao~t ,or of demand and supply enters into the quest,i()n 
more in the forme1"" tha.n in the .· latt er. 
The tendency of speculation to steady the market, is 
Panics. 
espeaially noticeable in time of panic. Then it is, 
that the short seller comes to the front. While hulls are 
pushing the pr:ice higher and higher, the bear is selling short 
all the time. If t.he bull ddd not have this OpPbS i tion sll 
the time, he would not reach his limit so soon. This is shown :., 
in rea.l estate ,booms, when priees attain sometimes 'helights vhs.t, 'ar~. 
foolish. If h · t .he sh' ort. se~llers br~ak the nriee ",' . , perc anoe, It 
and they usua lly do, :th8E down a.omee thre priee a.s former buyers 
now try to unload before it beeomes too late. !no. here comes 
the short seller onoe more and sustains pri,oes .. bypuying in or-
der to oover up. Thle constant striving t ,o prevent" prices from 
asoending too high; and then sustailaing by 'buying" tends to 
bring both end of the market together, th~t ,is to .steady prices. 
In 1898 when teiter sent wheat so high in an effort t~ , cornep 
from 
it, it was the short seller who prevented it"gQing higher, and 
sent it baak betw~en 50 and 60 ~ente in. one month,. and over 20rj 
more the next month . It was the muoh blamed: shol':,ts who , broke 
• . ', .. - tfi 
James R .Keene ' e oorn~r in whest. Theconet,ant" 'Q:pposi tion of 
these foroee tends all the tilne to bring the m,M~e.:t to a level. 
Eaoh aots as a brake on the other. In :imes .of g~eat expansion 
or inflation and the folloWing depre~sioni ' theopp-6.sition and 
its effeots are seen more clea.rly, but, th~s 8~m~ , a~:mmetitiQn g~'e,S 
on all tht't time; 1p. panics t expansion, and o;n:.dinaTY.' timeq, if 
there i s suoh 8 time. When the stock mark'e,t f'was at ,i ts highest 
a few ,-ears ago, the professionals, and j"t is ,to ., be hoped, a few 
of the publio, Were constantly selling; els~ )'Jh~r,e ,v~p~ld th~ 
publio have got the tremendous number ofshar:es Vfi¥ll which it 
loaded up? Vlhen the price breaks .. and great dul}~~,ss exists in 
the market and th~ publiC never take a lOQk at ~he quotations, 
then 18 'tl1e tim'e when the proteSs"ionsl bUys in ora~'r ' to unload 
upon the public"when tha.t -body' begins to hnyy 4lgaill; that is l1b.Etll 
p~ieea go up. " All thie oan 1;La:ve 0uly one e.fie,,:t , . that is tQ 
tend to equalize prices, or to steady them, 
Reduces 
ma. rgins. 
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It is ola imed that one result of speoulation in com-
modit ies, is to reduce the margin between the cos t 
price and the selling price, that is to sa.y between 
p roduoer an bonsumer. Now if this is so, then speculation does 
muoh good . A reduction of one cent or a fraction ther!3of means 
muoh to the world. when it is considered how many times that .frac-
tion of a oent or oent i s multiplied by the publicTs transactions. 
Now there is some ~v i dence of that fact in the change which has 
taken place in market quotat ions. Anyone looking Over the ta-
bles given on the price of wh eat, corn, cotton, must have noticed 
tha t a t first only f l at cents were quoted, and that later on 
sixteenths of a cent were quoted. This is true of wheat, corn 
and cotton . lliere cotton 8S quoted in fourths and eighths of 
a cent be f ore 1860 it is now quoted in sixteenths of a 'cent. 
Wheat was quoted in fourths, and i s ~ow quoted in sixteenths of 
a oent, and the tables show the transactions very well. Now 
what does this mean? That t he mi ddleman has had such f.fe~Qe 
competition tha t he has been forced to take smaller profits per 
bushel or bale etc. This i s lOWering the margin between the 
producer and the oonsumer. It is the competition that reduces 
the profits of miadlemen to a minimum. As they deal more and 
more they come to know the risks better, and to sb,ave profits 
oloser ; and it is speculation which makes this competition, ~O~ 
without speculation the market would be narrow. 
No the Indus t r i a l Commission found that between 1885 and 
1900 commercial expenses involved in concentrating grain at Chi-
cago, not including cost of transportation, but including ele-
vator charges at both ends and commission for selling at Chicago 
on consignment, decreased from a range of 3 1/2 cents to 10 3/4 
cents a bushel in 1885, to 2 1/4 cents to 3 3/4 cents per bushel 
1 
in 1900. . This is real service to the community. I h~ve no 
corn figures on the Bubject, but the testimony before the 6om-
missioner of Corporations tends to show the same result. The 
testimony was to the effect that whereas $2,50 a bale more or 
less was a ' common commission in the days b'efor·e the war, now a . 
great deal of cotton in handled at 50 cents a bale, and much at 
2 less than that figure. This is a great reduotion. Of course 
it is not all due to the influence of speculation, but probably 
some of this large decline ·is attributable to speculation; .at 
least i f not , it i s another of those peculiar co inc ideltofliS, . . 
In such reductions, however, nmch credit must be given to il'n-
proved methods of communication and transportation. 
Undoubtedly, however, speculation is responsible for some 
lessening of the margin, due · to shifting risks by hedging. As 
we have seen, without this buffer between market risks and the 
.. 
produver, the latter would have to charge a larger margin in or-
der to be safe. As we have gone over this before, it is only 
neces s ary to state that this benefit, , the transferring of ri~k 
1. Report of Industrial CommisSion, Vol.XIX,p.176. 
2. CommiSSioner of Corporations, 1909, Part IV,p.286. 
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by t h e producer to speculator, and. the consequent narrowing of 
mar g in between producer and consumer, is due to speculation arid 
to sp eculation alone. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
We have glanced at speculation from very early times, and 
have f ound traces of ~t in the time of Joseph of the Old Testa-
ment, and t h ose traces have led us down to the modern period. 
Speculation has particularly increased, of course, in its mod-
ern form in the l ast half century, due to greatly improved fa-
cilities, telephone, telegraph, cable, means of transportation 
etc. Electric wires and transport a tion have brought close to-
gether, in point of time, markets tha t are far dist ant . in point 
of s pace. As we have seBn, speeula~, ion seems to be inborn in 
man, and it is probable that it will continue in the future as 
it has in t h e past. e saw that s pecula tion was forecasting · 
comine events, and buying and selling in order to take advantage 
of them. Then we compare~ gambling and speculation which are 
not di f ferentiated in the ~inds of many persons, and came to the 
conclusion tha t there was a distinction, and that there would be 
a broa d 4istinctioD if speculation were beneficial on the whole, 
as gambling is certainly not. We then glanced at the stock 
and produce exchanges in order to see the immenSity of their 
transactions., and their internal organization and management. 
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TIe saw that they do an enormous business annually, and tha t 
about one-th ird. of the total wealth of the United States is in 
the form of securities. This alone is enough to make one pause 
before condemning speculation too hastily. Vi e reviewed th e 
meth ods of t rad ing and. the ways of conclucting and set tling the 
enormous number of contracts made on the exchange. 
~hen we examined the most important arguments, both for and 
against, s pecula tion on the stock ancl produce exchanges. 'VIe 
found that the so-called evils of such speculation seem to di-
vide themselves easily into three clas ses, first, moral a rguments; , 
s econd , evils of methods and customs of trade; third, arguments 
aga inst t he econimic utility of s pecula tion. It seems that the 
first class of evils i s g reat and that, considered. from the 
v iew- point of affecting public morals, t h ere is much to be co~­
demned in speculation, and that, if speculation does good along 
econo~ic lines, it does s o a t a tremendous moral cos t.. The 
s econd class , that is, arguments as to i mproper meth ods of dOing 
business, seem to be well f ounded in some instances, as the 
spreading of false intelligence, fraud in listing stocks, wash 
sales, prospectuses etc., but exage ers t ed in others, as corners 
and manipulat ions. ~he third class of argumEnts we cons idered 
at more length, and reached the conclusion that diverting mone~ 
said to be needed i n ordinary business, \!Jas not such a bad thing 
~ erhaps, as it i s represented to be. (It is interesting to 
note tha t in a r ecent interview I~r. Samuel Untermeyer, the well-
known corporation lawyer of, New York, recownends the curtai
ling 
of the loaning pOwer of national hanks on collateral, as se
eur-
0t 1 ly. His argument, however, is directed against the evil of 
combination of wealth in the banks in New York~) We saw that 
there is some waste involved in speculation, but that this 
is 
not such a great evil as it is commonly represented to be, 
for 
the reason that it helps to do good. However, there is strong 
authority on the other side, that is that there is much was
t e, 
as e have Seen . Next We merely noted the point of the rela-
tion between s peculation and financial crises, without comi
ng 
to any oonclusions. We then investigated the , popular argument 
tha t s pecula tion depress es producers T prices, and, came to the 
conclusion that it has not been proven, and that both stati
stics 
and other testimony point the other way; that is, that' spec
ula- ' 
tion does not , in the long run, tend t o loweJ:l or to raiBe the 
price patd to producers . 
That is to say, we ' found that there is a serious disadvan~ 
tags in speoulat ion becaus e of pub lic demoral izat'ion, anB. t
hat 
aome methods used are dishonest, but that arguments as to e
co-
nomic evils which s peculation is said to produce, do not · se
em 
to be very well proven. 
, . 
Now conSidering the arguments for speculat ton, we saw tb.-at 
it aots as a ba rometer of values, that is, po'int s the Y1ay t
o ' 
financia.l inv-eatment, to buying and , selling. It is said ths.t 
speculation equalizes mone,. pressure, and it ' seems probable 
( . . • 3 
1. New York World, September 8,1911 • . . 
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that it does so, and that is a dehefit. We saw that it facil-
it utes c redit ana affords a ready market at all times fOT arti-
cl es antl stocks subject to speculation. ~hen we considered 
the claim made that speculation on the produce exchanges acts 
as a buffer between producer and market , or shifts certain risks 
to the speculator . We found this claim a good one ana that 
speculation, by so d.oing , accomplishes much good . Then we con-
oidered the argument that speculation tends to steady prices, 
and found thnt the fair preponderance of the evidence ·is in fa-
vor of the argument , and that speculation ke.eps priees steady, . 
and lowers the margin between producer's prj.ce and cost to the 
consumer. 
With this very brief review of the arguments for and against 
speculation, the difficult task of weighing them and -passing 
judgment as to the ultimate utility of speculation must n~xt be 
per f orme!. !he first class of arguments used against s:pecnla ... 
, ' 
tion, tha.t is to say, public demoralization , cannot b~tid~imized.. 
It is a serious and powerful a.rgument against speculation. 
Now, ! beli eve that the second. class of argume.nts, that is. to 
say , argument s ag[!inst methods employed, may be much minimizeCi , 
for , although this is the most numerous class, ·s t:Lll it is P!e-
oise1y the class which can be most easily remed1ied. or controlled. 
In my opin ion the a rguments of the third class (against spe~ul~-
tion ) are not very strong or very well established. Now the 
arguments of the good which specula tiOn does along ecoDomic 
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on thew.holi 
lines, seem to me to beJ\·nllrly well proven. Consequently in 
the final analysis we are confronted with public demoraliza tion 
on t he one hand and economic welfare olft th e other. It is hard 
to choose between these two, and a choic e either way can be se-
verely criticised. My belief, however, is that speculation on 
the produce exchanges is for the best int erests of the community 
and world a t large. As to speculation on the stock markets, 
that is a more evenly ba l anced 'question, for I do not believe 
that so much economic good is done there as by specula tion in 
produoe exohanges. M;{ final decision is considerably influenced 
by t h e fact tha.t the abolition of speculation on the stock mar-
kets would not, by any means, reduce to a munimum tIle public 
demoralization wh ich is, mos t unfortunately, a natural conse-
quence of such s~eculation, but would only ' transfer it to specu-
lation in commodities or to the bucket shops. Therefore, tak-
ing into cons ideration the practical difficulties in the way of 
o9vising a means by which to abolish speculation on the stock 
exchane es, vii thout hinde ring inves tments J and in the way of en~ 
forcing that means, it is my belief that speculation on stock 
markets should be ret a ined as well as speculation in commodities. 
J ecommendations. 
But, a lthough I think that such speculation should be re,... 
t a ined, I -think tha t eertain ch~nges which would tend to . reQuae . 
t he present disadvantages of specula tion, particularly of 
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speculative lrlethods, should be made. To do so, it is p erhaps 
nece~sary to dip briefly into the legal status of speculation, 
and to cOl: s i der the experience of those countries which have 
attempted~ t o control speculation by legisl~tion. 
Common 
lav; . 
I n consitlering briefly the Law 111)on this subject, it 
1 
mus t be r emembered. that the Constitution leaves the 
State to regulate all internal affairs, and accordingly 
that there ma~r be a s many diff erent ststutes upon the subjeet 
ae there are states. Considering the Common Law rule, however 7 
whioh prevails i n most of the states, we find that contraets for 
2 
future delivery are 'enforceable a;nd legal. But if it is the 
agreeT:lent that t here shall be no delivery of the article con-
t ra.oted f or, and no pa:7ment , but a s tti lement by a payment in 
money ot the diff erence between the contract price and the mar~ 
ket price a t the time of delivery, this is a wager and net en~ 
3 forceahle at l aw . 
So lone as either party, however, can demand performance . . 
by t he other, accord ing to the contract, that is delivery by one 
1 . rt .I, s ecs . 8-l0, epd Amendment , Art.X. 
2 . 14 'Emerioan & English Encycloped ia of Law,p ~607 ancl cases 
oited in note 1. See Williston on Sal es,sec~664 and cas es 
i n note 101 There a re statutes against futures in Cal~ '~Ga., 
M.a.ss . t ~ o ., I! isa., .Y. See 14 Am . & Eng .Eney.of L8:w , p . 60'7, 
note 2 , and cases cited" . . . 
3 . Ha.rvey v .L errill~150 :Cass.l.2~ ~.E . ~9 , 5,.L.R.A" 200, 15 Am. 
Stat. Rep.159 . Numerous declslons to thlS effect_ are eol~ 
lected in 14 Am .& Eng .Ency .of Law , 2d ' ed.,pp.609-11, es~ecl&l 
ly 610 note 1. 
J.,,01 
for payment, or payment by one on delivery, then that contract 
1 
is legal and enforceable, even though neither party thinks it 
probable that it will be so carried out. But if this agree-
ment is only to pay by diff erences, then it is bad. At Com-
I(' • 2 
mon Law in :England, wage.,.s were not p,er se vOld. There is now 
a statute in England governing this subject and making gambling 
contracts null and vOid. 3 However, in the majority of the 
United States, gambling contracts have been illegal at Gommon 
4 5 
Law ; or if not, by statute. 
6 \ 
Buying and selling on margin is legal in absence of stat-
7 8 
ute. Short selling i s legal in most st ates unless there is 
9 
a statut e agains t it. In short the lega l situation is, that 
a contract for present or future delivery of any article wheth-
er own ed or possessed or not by the seller at the time of the 
contract of sale, whether paid for on margin or not, is legal 
and enio;;rceable,. 
1. 14 Am .& Eng.Ency.of La-w,611, note 2 and cases there cited. 
Dald's Pollock on Contracts,3d ed. by Williston, p .409,note 
63 and cas es cited. 
2. TI ewey, Contracts,p.ll and ca ses cited~ 14 Am. & Eng. Ency.of 
Law,586,note 1, 587,note 1 and cases cited. Wald's Pollock 
on Contrs.cts ,3d ed. by Viillistoll,p'.406,note 6 and cases ci ted. 
Clark on Contracts,276,note 86 and caSes cited. 
3. 8-9 Vict.c l09,~ 18. 
4. 14 Am.& Eng.Ency.of Law,589,notes 3,4, and cases 'cited. 
Dewey on Contracts for Ftltnre Delivery,p.ll and cases cited. 
5. Clark on C,ontracts, 277. See I Dos Passos ,476- 515; Dewey, 
14 ; 14 Am. & Eng. En cy . 0 f La Vll" 5 9 2 • 
6. Dewey on Contre 1ts,108,notes 1-2, cnd cases cited; Wi l liston 
on Sales,sec.664,note 6 and cases cited; Wald1s Pollock,by 
Vl illiston,40B,note 63; 1\m.~ Eng.Elley.of Law , 608,n.l,eases cit, 
7. Williston on S~les,sec.664,note 7 and cases cited. 
8. Ibidem. See p.125,note 1 & authorities there collected. 
9. Ibidem, note 10 and cases cited; I Doe ?as s os,476-51B for 
a collection of such statutes. 
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Legis-
l a- -
tion .. 
Now considering shortly some former legis l at ion on this 
subject and the effects, We find that the town of Yar-
mouth in 1400 prohibited speculation in herring. 
Yarmouth was the center of the herring trade at that time, and 
a l s o the center of a l a rge speculative trade. As speculat ive 
trading was stopped, it is said that unfortunately the Teal 
1 
trade decreased and went to other tmwns. 
Sir John Barnard's Act in 1734, shortly after the South 
Sea. BUbble, wasflto prevent the infamous pr?ctice of sto ck job-
2 
bing. lI . 3 It, however, was never enforced and was repealed luter. 
It tried to prevent the making of contracts (between persons not 
actually possessed of such stock), for the sale or purchase of 
stock a t a future period \.Ii thout the execution of the contract 
4 
by an actual transfer of the stock. However, statute in Englan·d 
now makes all wagering contracts null an d void. . . 
5 
In th e United St a tes, the Gold Act of March 3,1863 was 
6 
soon repealed, having a ccomplished no good . Congress it will 
be remembered, tried to stop trading in gold, so as to lower 
the price, but contrary to expectations, gold roSe from 220 to 
285 . It soon declined after the repealing act, however. ~here 
1. Thomas GibsonIs Sp ecial U.a rket Letters,1908,p.108. 
2. 7 eo. I I, c. 8 , ( 1 7 34) • 
3. 2~-24 Vict . c.28. See I Dos Pass os,487. 
4. 8- 9 Vict. c.109, §18. 
5 . 12 United States Stat . 719 . 
6. 13 United States Stat .,503. 
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have been many statutes passed on this subject by the diffe
rent 
I 
stat es. 
~le recent experience of Germany is profitable to us. 
In 1896 Germany Dass ed an act strictly regulating speculati
on 
in stocks and grain. Exchanee dealings for future delivery in 
grain and flour were forbidden; exchange dealings for the a
c-
count in mining and industrial stocks were forbidden; and e
very 
person who wished to engage in an exchange trans~ction for 
fu-
ture delivery must register or else his contract would be ,v
oid. 
This act did not accomplish its purposes, and lead to futhher
 
and unwished-for evils. Res l1ectable people refused to. s Jtgn 
the T1Gambling Reg ister '! as it was saIled, and took the l'{s,]~
 of 
the transactions being void. Speculation went on, but by erud-
er methods, and i tsuffered from the legal UD:certainty of tl
:tt~,':", Ii", 
bUSiness. The German Government Report attached to the amend-; 
atory bill 0f 1907 says: lIThe dangers of speculation have b
,esJ;l, 
increased, the power of the market to resist one-sided movements 
has been weakened, possibilities of misusing inside informa
tion 
2 
have been enlarged." The results of the aet have been sa
id to 
be: 
1. Increase of inflations and fluctuations. 
2. Demoralization of the money market through greater fluc-
tua:tions in the dema.nd for fund.s by which to earry speeulat
ive \ 
cash accounts. p, 
1. I Dos Passos, 476-515. 
2. H.C.Emery, ~en Years T Regulataon of Stock Exchanges in G
er- . 
many, p.15. 
:. 
104 
3. ~he business of the great banks i ncreased at the expense 
of the smaller ones. 
4 . Specula tive influence over industrial undertakings there-
by increased. 
5 . Drove business to foreign exchanges and weakened the 
Berlin money market . 
"Foreign brokers , seeing a new field of activity opened to 
them in Germany , flocked to Berlin and established agencies for 
the purchase and sale of stocks in London, Paris, Amsterdam , 
and New York. Seventy such off ices were opened in Berlin with-
in one year after the law was passed, and did a flourishing 
business. German capital was thus transferred to foreign 
1 markets. II 
I t is interesting to note that it is said, public demoral-
ization increas ed, for men hither to honest, welched on t h eir 
transactions , having such a fine opp ortunity to do so. r~ en 
bought and sold the same thing and pock eted their winnings , and 
wel ch ed on their losses. 
It is su i " tha t in 1896 Hamburg did twice the business of 
London in coffee. It is said tha t now, since the act, London 
2 
does more than Hamburg does. 
April 9 ,19 08 , Germany repealed t h e stringent provisions of 
the law of 1896. Gra in futures a re still forbidd en, but the 
1. Gov ernor Hughes T Committee, p .22. 
2 . Gibson 's Special Tarket Letters, 1908, p.l09. 
other restrictions have been removed. 
ister was abolished. 1 
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The Stock Exchange ~eg-
The Paris Bourse is very strictly regulated and controlled 
by the government, and its field is not so broad as that of our 
exchanges. 
We should be able to gather a warning lesson from Germany's 
expensive experience in legislation against speculation. It 
shows that the subject is a very difficult one and not to be so 
easily determined as the producers 1ft 1892 seemed to think. 
In my opinion, regulation upon such a subject is difficult, and 
in view of the game legislators play wl1ile passing tariff regu-
l ation etc, likely to be harmful. ' llThe history of these acts 
Seems to prove conclusively that they have not heen effective 
in preventing illegal speculation in stocks and produce. It 
is perhaps better to allow the evil to correct itself, as it 
surely does, than to bring the administration of justice into 
contempt by filling the books with useless laws, which are at 
all times openly violated and laughed at and which seem hardly 
more effective to prevent the pract ises at which they are aimed 
2 
than leg isla.tion directed against laws of nature. lI Therefore, 
if it is , possible to do so, it ~ould seem best for the exchanges 
themselves ' to guard against adverse legislati.on by a gradual 
raising of standards, and by strict enforcement of such rules ' 
1. 7he descrintion of this law and its effects etc, is taken . 
from Emery: ~ en Years l ~egulation, and ~ eport of Gav.Hughes T 
C oP.'rrni tt ee. 
2 -) h14 ' . I Dos Lassos, ~ . 
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a s they at pres ent have. The Chicago Board of ~rade is a 
fine example of what can be done a long t nis line. About 1899 
conditions were ruther scandalous , and. officers a,ncl mem1)er s 
were i mp licated in dishonest transact i ons. The better el~ment 
arose and. cleared t h e exchang e of former plagues, and weeded 
out the rasca ls. This pol icy of reform not only proveti grati-. 
fying morally, but a lso f inancially, for the price of memberShip 
. rose from ~800 to $4350 within two years, enriching the members 
considerably. It restored a certe in amount of public f a ith 
hich had been lost. 
Internal ::\egulat ion. 
In g en- The Governing Cormnittee of the New York Stoe~ "Exchange 
eral. 
hus great powers. I t has t h e power to raise th~ 
standards and tighten t he discipline. Having be·en in the bus -
iness for such a long time, that body certainly must know o£ 
present abuses which could be largely reduced by care and a c-
tion on it s part . There should be more care tak en as to the 
hones ty and solvency of th e members of the exchanges . I t · is 
true that puni shment after insolvency or dishonesty is discov~ 
ered, i s s evere, but it is a ca se of locking the barn doors .af-
ter the horse has been stolem. Prevention of t h ese evils of 
i nsolvency and dishonesty i s what is needed, not punishment .fer · 
them. 
Dishon-
esty. 
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:::> ishonesty inclu<.1. es wash sales, tampering Vi ith the 
list, rehypothecatinn of securities belonging to a 
cus tomer ~ithout that customer 's consent for more than 
the unpaid balance of purchase price etc. These things should 
be prevented fr~m within if possible, and expulsion 'Should be 
the only punishment. This is severe punishment to a broker, 
but it s severity should be a preventive and safeguard .. 
List. 
Certain measur es should be taken to prevent the list-
ing 0 f frauds. Especially should the Listing Committee 
require more publicity of facts as to a security which is about 
to be or has a lready been listed. 
!V:argins. 
It would. be desirable in my opinion, if ~ i margin (Df 
2~ should be accepted as the lowest instead of 10 
or less as at present. This would tend to prevent . '. 
:people of small means from lOSing on account of small fluctua-
tiona, as frequently happens at present. 
posed rule as quite important. 
I consider ,this pro-
Many persons, including Governor Hughes' Committee, 
Pyramid-
ing. have urged that the use ' of pap er profits should be 
prohibited. This would mean that when a speculator 
desired to pyramid, he would have to sellout and get gis cash, 
and then buy in once more. It is true that this would be in-
convenient, but it probably would not attain the object desir~d, 
and so is not recommended. 
Puts 
and 
Calls. 
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The rule against the sale of puts, calls etc, or 
privileges, at present on the books of many exchanges, 
~hould be firmly enforced, ana. enforoed not only OIl. 
the floor of the excha.nge as at present during business hour,s, 
but anywhere on the property of the exchange at any time.. And 
this should be made a rule of every exchange. 
Corners '. 
The adoption of such a rule as to eorners which " 
Governor Hughes' Committee ad.vocates would tend to 
lessen the occur rence of corners. The rule suggested is -that 
the' .. ,gGV,6r:tl\Qf,a shall ha.ve power to decide when a 00rner exists, 
and , to fix a settlement price, so as to relieve innouent per- ' 
I sons from the injury or ruin ~hich may result therefrom. 
Bucket 
shops. 
Any member in any way acting for or on behalf of a 
keeper of a bucket shop, knowingly, should be ex-
pelled. Some exchanges have this rule ' already. 
It should be , strictly enforced on every exchange. 
One of the most important things to be considered, 
Notices. 
is the adoption of rules to protect clients of the 
brokers. A full statement in writing of what the 
broker has done on behalf of his customer, should be furnished 
to every customer on the day of each transaction. Also, no 
member of ~ firm should be permitted to fill an order for any 
transaction with any person connected with that fi~, and of 
" 
course not to sell for hi~self what hiS 6ustomer orders him to 
1. Governor Hughes' Committee, p.8. 
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buy and vice versa. It is only f air to state that many ex-
changes have these or similar rules already, but unfortunately, 
they are not enforced as strictly as they should be. 
Strict enforcement of present rules and provision for as 
many more as are needed to protect the public from the dishon-
esty of members, expulsion for all infractions of such rules, 
and constant guarding by the governing bodies of the exchanges 
to keep the standards of their exchanges on a high level, is 
needed in this country far more than legislation, likely to' 
ha.v~ the same or simila r effects as those which Germany has 
experienced. 

